ABSTRACT
Introduction During the past decade, international attempts to reform or reconstruct the security sectors of states in crisis have become a growth industry. Through “security sector reform” (SSR) or “security sector governance” (SSG) assistance,1 exports of specific sets of Western security institutions and organizational structures have become both frequent and ubiquitous. Multi-and bilateral transfers of security institutions and capabilities target both the armed and law enforcement services of assisted states. Overshadowed in terms of public attention by the high-profile military interventions into Afghanistan, Iraq and the Balkans, a multitude of defense planners, police and justice specialists and development experts pursue security assistance projects across the globe. International experts train militaries in counter-insurgency operations, equip border police stations with new infrastructure, foster the civilian control of the armed and police forces, write national police laws, address interoperability issues of national defense systems, and offer assistance in the global fight against terrorism (see OECD Development Assistance Committee 2007 for an overview). In post-war territories under UN interim administration like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and, formerly, East Timor or Cambodia, international involvement has been particularly extensive, with international actors taking over executive police and military functions in addition to their training and advisory roles (see Stahn 2008; Zaum 2007). These new forms of international security governance transfers can result in complicated, multi-level security governance arrangements in assisted states. Particularly in areas of limited and weak statehood, the governance of security is no longer the exclusive privilege of a state’s security institutions, but includes a wide variety of domestic and international as well as public and private actors. Indigenous and imported security institutions coexist side-by-side, as do national and international actors. Yet, despite increasing resources dedicated to security sector reforms, we know relatively little about their possible positive or negative effects. As Hills (2008: 22) noted, the lion’s share of empirical studies about security sector reforms tend to be normatively driven, and often focus on the short-term policy implications of security transfers. Accordingly, the existing
literature has placed particular emphasis on the establishment of civilian oversight and accountability procedures (Wagner 2006; Born et al. 2003), on the necessity for local ownership in reform processes (e.g. Laurie 2007), and on ways of enhancing the overall comprehensiveness of security transfers (e.g. Ball 2004; Bryden 2004; Chanaa 2002). A second set of dedicated empirical studies of security assistance processes has inductively generated knowledge about the problems and pitfalls of individual security sector reform programs (for instance Sedra 2006; Friedrich 2004; Vetschera and Damian 2006). Here, insights gleaned from the large SSR missions in the Balkans, Timor Leste and Afghanistan dominate the literature (see International Crisis Group 2008; International Crisis Group 2005). Yet, beyond anecdotal evidence, few studies have provided an analysis of outright policy failures or of potentially adverse effects of security assistance. To start a discussion on the unintended effects of international security assistance policies, this chapter poses two interconnected questions: What are the likely effects – and particularly the unintended effects – of international security assistance programs on the governance of security in assisted states? When – i.e. under which conditions and in which stage of the transfer process – are these effects likely to occur? In doing so, the chapter adds a security-angle to ongoing debates in the international humanitarian and development assistance fields on how to avoid that international assistance does more harm than good in weak or post-war states. In the “do no harm” debate, the potential unintended effects of development assistance have received ample attention (see, e.g. Anderson 1999; Birdsall 2007). Anderson (1999) found that international assistance, even if it does save lives and alleviates suffering, too often reinforces divisions among contending groups, an argument that, as we will see, also holds for the field of security assistance. In the book’s wider context, the chapter further adds its specific take to the debate on unintended consequences of security governance. The chapter’s discussion of security exports complements Schneckener’s study in this volume that outlines statebuilding activities across three major state functions (security, welfare, rule of law) and focuses on the potential unintended consequences of different international statebuilding strategies. Adding to his more general arguments on statebuilding strategies, this chapter examines the unintended effects that appear during the reconstruction and reform of the coercive apparatus of the state. As an introduction into the debate, the chapter first traces the changing strategies and policies of security transfers over time and outlines how and to what end different actors have pursued various forms of security transfers. Then, it adapts the book’s notion of unintended consequences to the question of security transfers and outlines the major forms of unintended outcomes that it foresees during and after the transfer of security institutions. In its main part, the chapter then specifies different sets of unintended consequences that can occur during the planning and implementation of security assistance missions. To systematize the existing empirical material on unintended effects, the chapter draws on the concept of the policy cycle (see DeLeon 1999) as an organizing framework: it
distinguishes between the agenda setting, policy formulation, policy implementation and policy termination phases of international assistance and outlines why these phases each attract a different set of unintended consequences. Illustrative examples for each policy phase round off the discussion.
