ABSTRACT
Introduction For Gamal Mubarak, the son of Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak, the 2006 annual congress of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) was an opportunity to present himself and his advisors as the upcoming leadership team of Egypt. His speech was widely echoed in the national and international press, due to his controversial remarks about Egypt’s nuclear ambitions. By raising an issue of national security, Gamal Mubarak wanted to make sure that he was seen as the only “presidential” member of the congress (Al Ahram Weekly 2006). Subsequent assurances by the United States that it would support Egypt in developing a nuclear program triggered a debate on the coordination of Gamal’s initiatives with the United States and his growing influence in Egyptian political life. Over the last ten years, the question of dynastic power transfer (tawrith al sulta) turned out to be the distinctive feature of Egyptian politics. In 2005, Article 76 of the constitution was amended, allowing competitive presidential elections for the first time. The so-called reform trio, composed of Finance Minister Youssef Boutros-Ghali, Foreign Trade and Industry Minister Rasheed Mohamed Rasheed and Investment Minister Mahmoud Mohieddin, proposed various economic reforms such as a reduction in tariffs and taxes. Under the condition of increased international pressure for democratization in the Middle East, those political and economic reforms helped to improve Egypt’s image in the eyes of the international community. Still, they may do more than merely foster the shift to a market economy or enhance political pluralism; they are also likely to enable Gamal Mubarak to smoothly succeed his father (Hassabo 2006). While it is difficult to predict the outcome of the politics of succession, the rise of Gamal Mubarak raises the question of the international community’s role in Egypt’s ongoing “transition process.” Dynastic succession would be an unmistakable setback for the promoters of democracy. Since the revolution of 1952, the country has been ruled by three authoritarian leaders and, since 1981, by Hosni Mubarak. In a region where the personalization of political power and economic wealth is a distinctive feature of authoritarianism (Camau and Geisser 2003), rulers tend to hand over power to family members. Even though younger
people often present themselves as “modernizers,” it would be audacious to expect democratic change from a member of the ruling family. This chapter examines the role of the international community in this “transition process” by analyzing an area of “soft” security governance. In the late 1990s, the World Bank helped the Egyptian government to prepare a higher education reform program. Higher education reform is an example of economic and social reforms that aim to modernize Egypt’s economy and improve living conditions in the Middle East’s most populated country. The reform is only part of a wider security governance agenda that aims to create better socio-economic conditions in the region; however, some of its promoters view it as the most crucial element.1 The training of young people figures prominently in international attempts to stabilize the Southern Mediterranean, such as the EU’s Barcelona process, the US sponsored Middle East Partnership Initiative, and the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative approved by the G8 in 2004. Also, while the World Bank is only one of several donors supporting this reform, it can be considered as the donor community’s most powerful organization, playing an important role, among others, in the Egyptian reform process. Analyzing this role thus sheds light on unintended consequences of development aid more generally. This chapter focuses on two instruments of development aid that guide many international donor programs: the transfer of expertise and the empowerment of the third sector (this term here includes the private sector and civil society organizations). Both instruments have been introduced to avoid well-known negative effects of development aid. While their impact remains partly obscure, analyzing Egypt’s higher education reform process illustrates that these instruments are not exempt from producing unintended consequences of development aid. The first part of the chapter discusses negative effects of development aid and assesses the international community’s “new” development agenda. The second part looks at the World Bank’s involvement in Egypt’s higher education reform and assesses the two aforementioned instruments of expertise transfer and third sector empowerment. In a third step, I show how this particular set of development aid can produce unintended consequences and why it is difficult to prevent these consequences from occurring.
