ABSTRACT
A feature that separates Middle Eastern conspiracism from some other countries such as the US – though it is by no means exclusive to the Middle East – is the role played by the state in promoting conspiracist explanations and engaging in the narration of conspiracy theories. To varying degrees, many states seek to influence public discourse and political language by supporting or countering public explanations: witness how even democratic governments shape public debate about unpopular policies or questions about national goals and identity. This is different, however, and short of what states oftentimes do in the Middle East, where they go further and actively articulate and propagate conspiracy theories, including at times some rather outlandish ones. The most obvious examples are those that couch international influences or domestic political events as an outcome of Israeli or US meddling or plotting in the region or the country itself. More subtle but still a conspiracy theory, are narratives that argue that the state and/or the society is at risk from subversionist elements or from cleavages encouraged or endorsed by menacing external actors or by sinister adversaries in the society. States – in the form of leaders, institutional elites, state-owned media, and
such like – do this for a number of reasons, which are explored in this chapter. The most obvious is that states perceive a genuine conspiracy against them or against society. The second is that conspiracy theories provide a diversion; an explanation that distracts society and individuals from placing blame at the feet of the government and political leadership, and instead encourages blame-shifting to external actors. Sometimes, the more opaque and difficult to define these external actors are, the better, as disproving the state’s or the leadership’s narrative therefore becomes more difficult, if not impossible. Just as often, a state-sponsored conspiracy theory is less reactive and defensive, and instead is a calculated attempt by the regime at the creation of statedominant symbolism in the public realm. Such symbolism can be a component of the state’s self-image and the image it sends to society – little more than a marketing message, in other words. This noted, it can also be more profound: an image that sets the political parameters for society and especially for political competitors to the leadership, for example, or symbols that send a message to people about how the state sees state – society relations and
wants it to be seen by society. Finally, state conspiracy theories can be more Orwellian, an attempt to use political language for regime maintenance and even as a form of control, so as to shape the public perception of what is fact or fiction, or to crowd-out alternative explanations that are less appealing to the state. State conspiracism may even aim to artificially construct a symbiotic narrative of obedience with society: to misquote the old Soviet saying, the state pretends to tell the truth and society pretends to believe it. It is all of these factors, normally in combination – but with the combination varying by state, according to the degree of legitimacy enjoyed by the leadership and the room available to society to challenge the state’s explanations and language – that account for conspiracy theories in the Arab world that have been created, sustained and encouraged by the state.
