ABSTRACT
Since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, governments across the world have found themselves confronted by the dual challenge of adapting to a new security environment while almost simultaneously trying to propagate an adequate response to this seemingly new wave of terrorism. The fast flow of actions and reactions since the 9/11 attacks have left policy-makers little time for close introspection or long-term planning and evaluation of their chosen counter-terrorism (CT) strategies. This invariably resulted in a plethora of approaches, diverse in scope and objectives, many of them with little coherence and coordination of and between themselves. This book attempts to identify some of the most important dynamics and responses to international terrorism post-9/11 by looking at how various governments around the world have reacted to the changing security environment. Existing studies of counter-terrorism tend to be overly reliant on single case studies, particularly that of the American-led ‘global war on terror’, while neglecting other important regions and countries which have either been affected by the events of 9/11, or have proclaimed to be victims of the ‘new’ wave of international terrorism in that period.1 This book presents a multi-cultural study of approaches to CT, ranging from the Bush administration’s ‘Grand Strategy’ and affiliated responses from Britain and the European Union, to the case studies of Middle Eastern and North African regimes, Israel, Russia, India, Australia and South East Asia. In an attempt to identify common lessons from failed and successful attempts to counter the terrorist threat post-9/11, the conceptual framework of this book consists of the following comparative themes, which are visited in varying degrees in subsequent chapters:
1 How have the security/terrorist threats been conceptualized by various governments and with what justification?
