ABSTRACT
In 2008, Joe Knollenberg, the Republican representative from the 9th district of Michigan, lost his bid for a ninth term in the U.S. House. In the previous election Knollenberg had barely defeated his opponent in the general election, winning just 52 percent of the vote. As a result, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee targeted him as a vulnerable incumbent in 2008. The Democrats nominated a well-qualified candidate, Gary Peters, who had served in the Michigan State Senate until he was forced to retire because of state term limits and subsequently went on to serve as the State Lottery Commissioner. Congressman Knollenberg outraised his opponent by more than $1.6 million, yet he still lost his re-election bid. Similarly, Joe Porter, a Republican Congressman from the Nevada 3rd district, was defeated on Election Day. Porter had served in Congress for six years, yet in 2006 he barely won re-election by a margin of 48 to 47 percent. As a result, he was also targeted by Democrats and faced stiff competition from the minority leader of the State Senate Dina Titus. Despite a fairly substantial fundraising advantage, Porter was defeated in 2008. Incumbents in the U.S. House of Representatives regularly win re-election at a rate well over 90 percent (Jacobson 2009). As a result, pundits and political scientists often bemoan the lack of significant competition in congressional elections. Yet, in the two cases described above (as well as in 17 other House races in 2008), the incumbent failed to win re-election, despite numerous “advantages” associated with the office. More generally, a handful of House and Senate incumbents invariably lose their seats in Congress across individual election cycles. Examining specific trends in these House and Senate elections in which incumbents are defeated could provide vital insight into the declining rates of electoral competition as well as when the rare competitive election might actually emerge. In this chapter, we assess the current state of research on congressional elections, most notably by highlighting the declining rates of electoral competition in House and Senate races over time. In light of the exponential growth in the amount of scholarship on congressional elections during the past few decades, it would be impossible to thoroughly examine all facets of
this research in a single essay. Instead, we focus on a central puzzle in congressional elections research: why some incumbents lose each election cycle despite the inherent advantages accruing to incumbents. We begin our discussion by addressing one element beyond the direct control of individual candidates-the electoral context. Next, we point to three areas of research that offer clues about why electoral competition is declining as well as when the rare competitive election might occur: the actions of incumbents, the role of challengers, and the impact of money in elections. Finally, we conclude our discussion with specific suggestions about new directions for congressional elections research.
