ABSTRACT
There were early signs that Anwar al-Sadat planned on reorienting Egyptian foreign policy away from the Soviet Union; however it was not until after the 1973 war that he moved his country into a close alignment with the West. This fundamental shift was reflected by changes in Cairo’s intelligence liaison relationships. For the first time since the mid-1950s the CIA enjoyed close ties with EGIS that included intelligence exchanges, technology transfers, training and joint operations. On the other hand, as Egypt’s relations with the USSR continued to deteriorate, Sadat began directing his secret police against alleged Eastern Bloc espionage rings inside the country. In addition to Moscow, Sadat earned another set of enemies. By pursuing peace with Israel, the Egyptian president was opposed by former allies Syria and Libya who resented Egypt’s retreat from the Arab cause. Libya in particular used subversion and violence to destabilize Sadat’s regime and this sparked a border war with Egypt in 1977. Finally, the 1979 revolution in Iran and the radical shift in that country’s policies created a new long-term security challenge for Egypt and its peace treaty with Israel. The year 1979 was also a year of opportunity for Sadat. Increasingly isolated in the Arab world, Sadat saw an opportunity to burnish his Islamic credentials by opposing the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In fact, Egypt was one of the first countries to sign on to Washington’s plan to arm and train the mujahedin resistance. Despite his many foreign supporters, Sadat never enjoyed much popularity inside Egypt. Moreover, as the 1970s progressed, his regime was increasingly isolated from a population embittered at its lack of economic opportunity, the corruption of the political establishment and the increasingly dictatorial habits of the president. Islamist trends accelerated with the encouragement of Sadat himself who saw the Islamists as a counter to his Nasserite and leftist opposition. But the president underestimated his opposition and on 6 October 1981 a small cell of Islamist revolutionaries successfully carried out his assassination. It was one of the biggest failures in the history of Egyptian intelligence.
