ABSTRACT
Ontological status of ethical value concepts The first and the second problems have been elaborately treated by George Hourani in his book Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics.1 The reason why these two closely related issues concerning ontological and epistemological aspects of moral values are considered separately in this study is due to the possibility of giving different answers to each problem. For example, believing in the objective status of ethical values does not necessarily imply that they can be known by reason. Thus, some may hold that although goodness and badness are innate properties of things and actions, revelation is the only trusted source of ethical knowledge. The two rival theories concerning the nature of ethical values, encapsulated by Euthyphro’s dilemma, were also debated by Muslim scholars. The proponents of each theory claimed that they represented the true meaning of the Qur’ān. Whether Muslims were aware of Euthyphro’s dialogue or not is beyond the limits of this study. It is obvious that such theories may naturally emerge in discussing any ethical problem. Thus some Qur’ānic verses which were considered to support each view will now be studied and an attempt to reveal the most appropriate and most probable interpretation will be made.
