ABSTRACT

In 58 Rome experienced a tribunate with a difference. Publius Clodius Pulcher had decided to use the office of tribune and his popularity with the plebs as an alternative route to power and he introduced a level of intimidation into politics that had not been witnessed before. The Senate had no resources or strategies to counter the threat this posed to the Republic and it presaged a period of escalating violence and intimidation within the political and judicial processes and on the streets. Clodius prevented Bibulus, who had finally emerged from his villa, from speaking at the ceremonial oath-taking which concluded his consulship and Dio (38.12) records that ‘Clodius silenced him and then went on to make an attack on Cicero’. This episode is important for two reasons. Clodius’ attack on Bibulus demonstrated his support of the Triumvirate, and his attack on Cicero, who was now ‘a burden and trial to others’, and had lost a lot of support because he was an ‘incomparable boaster’ (ibid.), made it clear that Clodius had him in his sights. Unfortunately none of Cicero’s letters remain from this period and we do not have his own views on the events which would culminate in his exile. Clodius immediately put forward four Bills, all of which were passed

without opposition. Dio (38.13) argued that his programme was aimed at winning over the plebs but also had appeal for the equites and senators; it had been carefully constructed to ensure that Clodius, the ‘patrician’ tribune, acquired unimpeachable popularis credentials without alienating the political establishment. His first measure concerned the legalisation of the collegia. These were religious and social organisations, usually based on shared occupations or localities, and the main centres of leisure in the poorer districts of the city, taking charge of certain festivals and working to the members’ mutual benefit under the leadership of elected officials. Membership of collegia was voluntary, but for a modest membership fee they provided a social focus and benefits such as funeral clubs. Collegia were greatly valued by the lower classes and varied in size from a hundred

to over a thousand members. They were important also to the political life of the city; Tatum (1999: 26) writes, ‘the political potential of collegia, especially for winning popular support, was no secret in Rome’. Cicero had been well aware of their importance and had carefully followed the advice in the Handbook on Electioneering (30), ‘if you establish a friendship with the leading men of the collegia, then, through them, you will easily secure the remainder of the masses’. After a series of violent incidents the Senate had banned certain collegia in 64, claiming they were subversive and hostile to the state. They had also banned the Ludi Compitalicii, games celebrated after the Saturnalia in honour of the gods of the crossroads and organised by the collegia. Clodius had built up a strong political network among the newest citizens

and the first law he promulgated, the lex de collegiis, legalised and reestablished the banned collegia. New collegia were also set up which often attracted those who had previously been unable to join because they could not afford the subscriptions. These organisations required patrons, and Clodius and his closest followers obliged, forging links with the grateful collegia which later provided Clodius with the gangs with which he terrorised his rivals and sabotaged political life. Lintott (1999: 196) argues that Clodius ‘wanted the city mob as a permanent source of power’ and ‘pursued urban political power as an end in itself’. In this he differed from prominent populares of the past who had used the plebs urbana for more limited political objectives. To bind the plebs more closely to him Clodius granted a free monthly

ration of 5 modii of grain to all those aged ten and above. Fluctuations in food prices were common in Rome. Most of the grain consumed came from Sicily, Sardinia and Africa and practices had developed piecemeal to ensure its correct storage, shipment and sale. Intervention had first come in the 120s when Gaius Gracchus had passed the lex frumentaria during his tribunate which had subsidised the price and introduced a ration to stabilise price volatility. This practice was expensive and Sulla had abolished the grain dole during his dictatorship, although it had been restored by the lex Terentia et Cassia in 73. The costs to the Treasury had increased significantly since 62 when Cato had passed an additional measure in response to the economic distress of the time to assist the ‘poor and landless masses’ (Plutarch, Cato 26). Clodius’ grant of free grain certainly trumped all previous reforms. Tatum (1999: 121) comments, ‘Clodius’ law was welcome to all divisions of the plebs urbana and won him the people’s lasting devotion’. It seems likely that the collegia were used for grain distribution which further enhanced their influence. Estimates differ on the precise cost of this policy but a new coin had to be minted in 58 to pay for it and funds were diverted from the new province of Cyprus to contribute to the costs. Clodius next championed the lex Aelia, a Bill which provided much

needed clarification of the use of public omens and sacred periods to

disrupt the legitimate business of government. The observation, spectio, and reporting, obnuntiatio, of unfavourable omens in person, was carefully defined in the new law. Bibulus’ behaviour in 59 had demonstrated inherent problems in the existing system, therefore Clodius’ law faced little resistance; the potential danger of Bibulus’ tactics must have been clear to all, friend and foe. The law was not made retrospective so the issue of Caesar’s legislation and its legality remained untouched. In an ironical twist, the villain of the Bona Dea affair had become the defender of religion. A fourth measure put forward by Clodius, the lex Clodia de censoria

notione, concerned the revision of the senatorial roll. This was normally carried out by the censors who could expel senators by reading out their names from a list without any opportunity of appeal or self-defence; sixty four senators had been expelled in this way in 70. Clodius’s law stated that no senator could be expelled unless both censors agreed and it could be done only after those named had an opportunity to respond. It has been generally accepted that Clodius put forward this law to make it difficult for the Senate to expel him in future although Cicero insisted he was attempting to neutralise the censors. The Bill had considerable support among the senators who felt the procedures had been unjust and that it introduced a much-needed element of dignity to the proceedings which had been lacking. The law was passed but proved unworkable and was removed in 52 as the hearings in 54 were too many and too lengthy. Atticus had returned to Rome to support Cicero personally in 58 and

their customary flow of letters was suspended; lacking these personal insights we are, therefore, largely dependent on later sources to examine this period. Cicero was completely unconvinced by Pompey’s assurances that Clodius would leave him alone and decided to nip his activities in the bud. Dio (38.14) writes that Cicero used a tribune, Ninnius, to block Clodius’ measures. The four Bills had been well received by the plebs, but also by the Senate, and Cicero feared Clodius’ growing popularity. Clodius planned to revive the Ludi Compitalicii, due to be held on 1 January, to underline his own role in the restoration of the collegia and revel in his resulting popularity. Ninnius hoped to scupper the joyful celebrations and appeared in person to insist that the prohibition of 64 be upheld. He cut an embarrassingly ineffectual figure in the face of Clodius’ vehement opposition and backed down, but Clodius knew Ninnius could employ his veto at any time and appealed to Cicero to restrain him in return for his guarantee to leave Cicero alone. Cicero agreed, although why he was prepared to accept Clodius’ word when he had not accepted the reassurances of Pompey remains a mystery. It is possible Cicero had been persuaded by some third party, possibly Cato or Hortensius, attempting to draw Cicero away from Pompey by giving personal assurances about Clodius’ future conduct.