ABSTRACT
Any study of Sulla’s regime is limited by the paucity of contemporary sources, although later writers such as Plutarch had access to material that has been lost, such as Sulla’s own memoirs. Many later sources are hostile to Sulla and must be used with caution. When Sulla returned to Italy in spring 83 an SCU had been passed
against him. Civil war was his only option, as there was no chance of a negotiated settlement. The March on Rome in 88 was deeply embedded into the collective memory and Sulla was generally perceived as a brutal and vengeful man who must be resisted. Many flocked to join the opposition forces assembled by the consuls Scipio and Norbanus which were massing in Campania to block his advance on Rome. Sulla and five loyal and experienced legions had crossed in two groups from Dyrrachium and landed at Brundisium and Tarentum. Sulla’s soldiers had taken an oath to stand by their general, even offering their own money to assist the military effort. Their exemplary conduct as they marched along the Via Appia, under orders to leave all inhabitants and their possessions untouched, was unexpected. This provoked rumours that Sulla had returned to restore peace, not make war, a possibility which attracted leading optimates such as the well-respected proconsul Metellus Pius, son of Marius’ commander in Numidia. Many senators began to throw their support behind the man who claimed to defend their political interests, and the numbers joining Sulla’s forces increased every day. One important recruit was Marcus Licinius Crassus, who had fled to Spain to escape the Marian terror during which both his father and brother had died. He had raised his own force and had briefly joined up with Metellus Pius but, after a quarrel, continued alone to join Sulla by way of Africa. He was entrusted with the task of recruiting among the Marsi and, according to Plutarch (Crassus 6), ‘raised a considerable force, and showed himself an eager partisan of Sulla in his struggles’. Crassus was immediately overshadowed by the twenty-three-year-old Pompey, who arrived at Sulla’s camp with a private army of three legions.
He had raised them from his clients and had successfully defeated three enemy generals en route. Sulla was impressed. The forces of Sulla moved north towards Capua during the summer of
83 and the consuls divided their armies the better to resist the advance. Having failed to negotiate with the slippery Norbanus, Sulla defeated his army, which then retreated to Capua. Scipio was prepared to make terms, as were others in the Senate who hoped to avoid further bloodshed. He reached an agreement with Sulla but it was never implemented because Quintus Sertorius, Scipio’s envoy to Norbanus, a bitter enemy of Sulla, who had always opposed the talks, reopened hostilities. Sulla’s image as a man of peace was enhanced by this episode, as he had appeared willing to end the war but had been undermined. The episode further demoralised Scipio’s army, which now changed sides, and Sulla let Scipio go. This act of clemency further suggested he could be trusted and would deal fairly with his opponents, but Carbo was not deceived. He remarked that Sulla had both a fox and a lion in his heart and ‘he was more annoyed by the fox’ (Plutarch, Sulla 28). The new consuls of 82 were Carbo, now in his third term, and Marius’
twenty-six-year-old son. Both sides spent the winter recruiting forces and Sertorius, very critical of Marian efforts so far in the war, returned to Spain, his propraetorian province. Sulla occupied himself in negotiations with representatives of the newly enfranchised Italian citizens, promising to honour the arrangements made, particularly about their distribution among the tribes, although it would appear that the Samnites, major opponents of Sulla during the Social War, were excluded from these talks. Possibly he held a grudge against them but it is equally likely he did not recognise the legality of their citizenship which Marius and Cinna had granted in 87. Sulla appreciated the importance of winning over those Italian communities which had not yet declared for either side and this policy further swelled his support. Although there was no further fighting within Italy during the harsh winter of 83-2, the Marians faced serious problems elsewhere when the Marian commander in Africa, Hadrianus, was killed and Balbus lost Sardinia to Sulla. Carbo had positioned himself in Ariminum, guarding the entrance to
Cisalpine Gaul, and Metellus headed towards him in the spring while Sulla tackled the young Marius, who recklessly attacked Sacriportus and was forced to retreat to Praeneste, making it into the city himself only by the skin of his teeth and the strength of his men who hauled him up and over the walls clinging to a rope. Sulla put to death all the Samnite prisoners, according to Appian (1.87), because ‘they had all along been ill affected toward the Romans’, a clear statement that Sulla considered they were not true Roman citizens and, therefore, not entitled to special treatment. After digging ditches and building a wall around Praeneste, Sulla handed control of the siege to Afella, but the young Marius was somehow able to send
a message to Damasippus, the urban praetor, urging the Senate to execute any important Sullan sympathisers, and four men, including Quintus Scaevola, the pontifex maximus, were killed and their bodies thrown into the Tiber. This vengeful action terrified many of Sulla’s senatorial opponents who, fearing Sulla’s wrath, now fled the city. When Sulla reached Rome the gates were opened to him but he chose not to enter. He left a garrison behind and headed north to Clusium to find Carbo, already under attack from Pompey and Metellus, and a series of indecisive skirmishes followed which hit Carbo’s forces particularly hard. Repeated Marian attempts to free the young Marius and his forces had failed; now, incensed by Sulla’s treatment of the Samnite prisoners, a combined force of 70,000 Samnites and Lucanians set off for Praeneste in late summer. This was a serious threat and Sulla took charge of the campaign personally, blocking their route through the only pass and preventing all Marius’s attempts to break out. Norbanus had already fled to Rhodes, where he would later take his own life, and now Carbo and a group of friends fled to Africa, ‘spinelessly’, according to Appian (1.92), although Carbo always intended to continue resistance from the province. The desperate Marians, deprived of their most experienced generals,
attempted to divert the Sullan forces by marching on Rome and, led by the Samnite leader Telesinus, reached a position close to the Colline Gate on 1 November. They made no attempt to take the city but waited as Sulla and his forces rapidly approached. Despite the exhaustion of many of his men, and against the advice of his officers, Sulla began to fight in the late afternoon. Crassus and the right flank did well but Sulla’s own forces on the left did not hold their position. Sulla himself was recognised and barely escaped with his life. He was forced to return to camp. Although news that Sulla had been killed reached Praeneste, Afella refused to believe it and continued the siege. The battle resumed during the evening and continued well into the night; it ended when the Sullans took the Samnite camp and found Telesinus and the other leaders among the dead. Crassus excelled during the battle of the Colline Gate. He chased away
and then defeated a large Marian force at Antemnae and Sulla hurried to join him at dawn on 2 November as soon as the situation around Rome itself was stable. Three thousand of the rebels within Antemnae asked to make terms and Sulla offered them safe passage if they would kill any of his opponents still inside. When this was duly done, however, the rebels were rounded up with other prisoners taken at the Colline Gate and brought to the Villa Publica in Rome, the building usually used to receive foreign ambassadors. Sulla had returned to the city and summoned the Senate to meet in the nearby Temple of Bellona. He then gave the order to massacre the 6,000 prisoners and began the terror with which his name is associated. Plutarch (Sulla 30) writes that ‘the shrieks of such a multitude, who were being massacred in a narrow space, filled the air and the senators
were dumbfounded’. Sulla continued to address the Senate with apparent disregard. The image of the man of peace fighting for a peaceful Rome was over-
turned and the tone of Sulla’s new regime was set. After his speech, Sulla set off for Praeneste, bearing the severed heads of many Marians who had fallen at the Colline Gate. The message was clear: further resistance was pointless. The city quickly surrendered, although the young Marius evaded capture and probably killed himself after attempting unsuccessfully to flee through the town’s drainage system. Sulla received his head from Afella. There is some disagreement in the sources but it is likely Sulla then divided the captives into three groups and pardoned the Romans but killed the Samnites and those from Praeneste who had supported Marius. Sulla’s men, taking their cue from their commander, now saw all opponents of their general as legitimate targets, to be hunted down within the city and throughout the Italian peninsula. The ensuing violence was unco-ordinated and savage, and motivated as much by profit and sadistic pleasure as by a genuine desire to take revenge on Sulla’s enemies. There were dark days ahead.
