ABSTRACT
To note that the current world is marked by confusing changes or paradigm shifts is certainly a cliché if nothing else. And yet the conceptual confusion that surrounds PMSCs is a result of demonstrable shifts in the economic, political and military environments in which they are flourishing. These changes point to a complex profile of new wars. The origins of the PMSC industry are – like other protean mythical characters – shadowy, indistinct, and prone to exaggeration. According to some accounts, PMSCs arose spontaneously in response to a diverse set of market realities that sprang onto the scene in the last two decades (Chesterman and Lehnardt 2007: 181; Avant 2005: 114-115; Singer 2003: 53; Mandel 2002: 38). Other accounts stress an almost conspiratorial attempt by a vague array of business and governmental leaders to subvert established laws and governance and create shadow proxy forces answerable only to them (Silverstein and Burton-Rose 2000: 45; Scahill 2007: 148ff; Zarate 1998; Pelton 2006: 343). In between are many military scholars that see the rise of PMSCs as a logical outcome of fundamental shifts within the military, and in response to a changing operational environment on the ground – “new wars” (Turner and Norton 2001; Guillory 2001; Smith 2002; Nitzschke 2005; Adams 1999). Each of these stories has some degree of truth to it. And each contributes to the background assumptions that have allowed PMSCs to flourish even as they are being criticized and
held in suspicion. In the previous chapter I stressed the tripartite character of the protean PMSCs, and I sketched out how each of the cultural types – soldier, business person, and humanitarian – showed up as part of the complex character of these organizations. This chapter expands on these initial descriptions to give an account of the changes in the world in which these types operate. This chapter begins with five of the typical accounts of how PMSCs have originated: first, the more passive idea of a market for force; second, the more conspiratorial account, wherein specific political frustrations led to policies that encouraged the use of private proxy force. The third account stresses the role of a change in ideas – specifically the neoliberal idea that downsizing the state will be more “cost effective” on a number of fronts. This account includes the new prominence of global civil society organizations – NGOs – as more efficient actors in complex humanitarian disasters. The fourth change responsible for the spread of PMSCs concerns a shift in the idea of warfare. “New wars” are complex operations that involve multi-lateral and multinational regular forces, and a complex web of irregular armed forces. They include new strategies and tactics, and new relationships with private NGOs as well as IGOs (International Non-Governmental Organizations) like the United Nations. In the complex mix of the new war, PMSCs can flourish. Finally, I turn to the new soldier that fights in these wars, and how the availability of specifically this type of figure influences the character of the PMSC. These five origin stories – market and political forces, the force of ideas, new wars, and new soldiers – will provide a background to the next chapter on the relationship between PMSCs and the new attitudes toward risk and security.
