ABSTRACT
Interest in the impact of US hegemony is not new among scholars of international relations. During the 1970s, scholars became absorbed with the possible linkage between the perceived decline in US power and instability in key institutions of the post-Second World War international order.1 A heated debate then ensued in the 1980s over the reality or fiction of US hegemonic decline;2 one that was decisively put to rest with the end of the Cold War and the steady expansion of US power over the course of the following decade. What has sparked a third wave of interest in examining the nature of US hegemony, and particularly the limits or lack thereof of US power, was the increasingly unilateralist approach taken to the formation of foreign policy, a trend which reached its apogee during the tenure of the administration of George W. Bush. The preference for unilateral action first became evident during the tenure of the Clinton Administration in the context of waning support within the UN Security Council for the application of a containment strategy against Iraq. Of note were the effectively unilateral military strikes on Iraqi air defences in 19963 to police the ‘no-fly zones’, and on alleged Iraqi WMD sites in December 1998 (known as ‘Operation Desert Fox’) after the expulsion of UNSCOM inspectors by Saddam Hussein. Prior UN Security Council authorisation was not forthcoming in either case. This tendency clearly accelerated under the leadership of the Bush Administration, demonstrated among other things by the refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court, opposition to the creation of an additional protocol strengthening the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and US withdrawal from the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty. The high point for this go-it-alone strategy came in the form of an ambitious military operation to effect regime change in Iraq in 2003, without UN Security Council authorisation, nor significant backing from many long-standing allies. The unilateralist character of the Bush Administration’s foreign policy has been argued to derive from a combination of unique forces and views. September 11, 2001, revealed the existence of a new and formidable terrorist threat to US national security which succeeded in exploiting the openness of US society to effect real damage to the homeland with relatively meagre material resources. Whilst any government would be under a duty to counter to such a threat, the
response taken was highly influenced by the Administration’s understanding of the significance of the ‘unipolar moment’4 and the unique opportunity this afforded to the US to re-shape the rules and norms of international order, with or without the support of long-standing allies. Normatively, the Administration became convinced that the existing rules and norms on the use of force in self-defence needed significant revision to take into account the revealed aims and methods of terrorist organisations, and the potential magnification of the terrorist threat should alliances be formed with ‘rogue’ states. Further, the war on Iraq demonstrated a strong ideological conviction that the promotion of liberal democracy, through forceful and non-forceful means, provided the best means of addressing the root causes of terrorism and conflict. At the same time, the ‘unipolar moment’ provided the US with a unique opportunity to pursue and defend national interests and values, which were believed to be benevolent,5 unfettered by the need to take into account the views and interests of other states, whether those of rivals or allies. The increasing trend towards unilateralism in US foreign policy, during the tenure of both Administrations, has turned attention towards the broader implications of the emergence of a hegemonic state in the system on international order. The Bush Administration’s lack of faith in institutional solutions to common problems, and selective observance of international legal or normative constraints, raises the question of whether hegemonic power can be limited by the rules and norms of international order. Does it in fact matter whether a hegemonic state’s behaviour is viewed as illegitimate by international society? Do questions of international legitimacy significantly influence the behaviour and interests of hegemonic states or other states in their response to a hegemon in the system? If not, does the emergence of a unilateralist and revolutionary hegemon constitute a threat to the continued existence of a pluralistic international order and society?6 This book enters into the debate over whether international legitimacy truly matters in an international system dominated by a lone superpower. It does so with two key aims. First, I seek to examine the nature of the relationship between hegemony and international legitimacy as theoretical concepts. Within the literature, two broad approaches to hegemony can be discerned. Materialist approaches (realist in orientation, including hegemonic stability theory) define hegemony as a relationship of dominance in which a hegemon maintains international order by using its predominant material resources to reward and coerce subordinate states. Questions of international legitimacy are second order concerns. In contrast, normative approaches (Gramscian and constructivist) characterise hegemony as a socially recognised leadership role based primarily upon a hegemon’s ability to lead international society by engendering consent and consensus around an ideological programme for the achievement of common goals. A hegemon is able to maintain order without relying heavily on coercion and bribery, as followership by subordinate states is largely spurred by the internal acceptance of the legitimacy of international order. In sum, the book’s first objective is to evaluate whether hegemony in the post-Cold War era is best conceptualised as a relation of dominance or of leadership.
