ABSTRACT
While no extended archaeology of legal foundations is purported in this work, it is argued that the structural form of legal foundations (the alleged meta-reference of law) is not just an apparatus of power that conceals the making, of legal foundations, but is more generally the problematic limit concept of old-European jurisprudence and legal theory. If a limit concept always separates two realms or things, the test of its truth lies in whether it shows a real separation between two different things. Every attempt to critique or redefine the structure of the foundation of law resorts, whether consciously or not, to redraw the boundary line between two powers (i.e. constitutive and constituted power), yet obliterates the obvious attempt, each time, to collapse one power into another. The task of proper criticism takes the obvious as its heaviest burden and this task can neither be complicit in such pseudo-opposition and celebrate the foundational lineage of legal mythological constructions, nor reactively critique such foundations and its laws in order to progressively improve, correct or perfect the laws in question, without ever challenging or cognizing the problematic structure that produces such foundations in the first place.
