ABSTRACT
This chapter will examine how the Palestinian leadership dealt with the joint American-Soviet invitation to participate in the peace process. Because the timing and conditions of the invitation took advantage of the weakness of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) outside, the complementary relationship between inside and outside became crucial. The loyalty of the inside to the PLO leadership outside, and the harmony that existed in their political positions enabled the leadership to have its cake and eat it, too. It did this by appointing a delegation from the inside (thus getting around prohibitions on PLO participation in the talks) that would present PLO negotiating positions. Similarly, this delegation had no difficulty in maintaining the role of loyal emissaries. This has never been properly understood in the literature, which mistakenly viewed the inside and outside as competitors. This chapter will show that despite the political harmony that existed between
the inside and outside, each group nonetheless had different emphases and priorities, coloured by their specific realities. The outside wanted the delegation to the talks to pursue tactics that would restore the direct representative role of the PLO outside, including bringing it to the negotiating table. The inside, on the other hand, preferred a negotiations approach that would help stop illegal Israeli activities, especially those consolidating the occupation and oppressing Palestinians in their homeland. In sum, while the structure of the negotiations was determined according to Israeli preferences, the Palestinians were to some extent (but not entirely) able to overcome this problem. Finally, this chapter will demonstrate that the flexibility of the leadership over
issues of representation, the formation of the delegation to the talks, and the negotiations’ structure and process did not succeed in offsetting the negative political environment. The imbalance of power, continued Israeli provocations, and impartial attitude of the talks’ sponsors all prevented the negotiations from succeeding. The scope of this chapter will cover the international Middle East peace
conference in Madrid on 31 October 1991, and the subsequent bilateral IsraeliPalestinian negotiations in Washington, DC that started in December 1991. The
conference was called by joint invitation from the United States and the Soviet Union. The joint letter of invitation and letters of assurances from the United States to the parties to the talks served as terms of reference and were based on United Nation Security Council resolutions 243 and 338, and the principle of land for peace. These also stipulated that the peace process would have two phases: an interim phase that would produce agreement on Palestinian autonomy, and a final agreement addressing a final and comprehensive peace. This peace initiative had a particular historical context. During the Gulf
War, in which many Arab states sided with the United States against the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the United States was accused of double standards, that is, being comparably tolerant of Israeli occupation of Arab land. As a result, the American government wanted to compensate its Arab allies. Another motive was the weakness and isolation of the PLO leadership, which convinced the American administration that it could either bypass the PLO or encourage an alternative leadership from the OPT, an objective sought by Israel from the early stages of its occupation. In other words, the United States thought that the regional political environment was conducive to a process Israel could accept, and the Palestinian leadership could not reject.1
