ABSTRACT
This book is based on a PhD thesis that was submitted to the School of Government and International affairs at Durham University in 2007. It attempts to examine to what extent did the composition and behaviour of the Palestinian leadership have an impact on the process and outcomes of negotiations with Israel from Madrid to Oslo II. The peace process attracted the attention of researchers, first when it suc-
ceeded in convening the first direct peace conference and direct bilateral and multilateral negotiations in Madrid (1991), and later when the two sides reached agreement for the first time in history in Oslo (1993). However, after the collapse of the peace process at the Camp David negotia-
tions in 2000, the main question for researchers became why the talks failed, and what went wrong. Needless to say, there are a number of reasons for the failure of the negotiations – some related to the Israeli partner, some to the Palestinian, and some to third parties, including the sponsors of the process, donors and regional powers. Certainly, the failure of the peace process has farreaching implications for both the Middle Eastern and international studies, on the political reality in Palestine, Israel and the region. Studying the experience of the peace process and evaluating the various factors that contributed to its outcome is an important contribution to solving current problems, and ensuring better chances for future initiatives to bring peace to the conflict and the region. While all the factors that contributed to the outcome of the process should
be studied (and many have been studied), Palestinian internal factors contributing to the failure, including the composition and behaviour of the leadership, have been the least examined and understood. Even when they were researched, the results included basic shortcomings and gaps. In addition – in what is perhaps a contributing factor to these shortcomings – most of the work was carried out by non-Palestinians who, at the very least, lacked original data and first-hand access to the main events and players. Therefore, by researching the structure and the behaviour of the Palestinian
leadership and their impact on the outcome of the process, with sufficient access to original data, primary resources and main players, this book will fill some of the existing gaps in our knowledge, and contribute to a better understanding of the failure of the peace process.
