ABSTRACT
This chapter will look at the current literature on the peace process, which has been the subject of extensive reporting and analysis. For our purposes, ‘peace process’ means the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid (October 1991), the subsequent Washington bilateral negotiations (December 1991-July 1993), and the Oslo negotiations’ process and agreements (December 1992September 1993). The reason for examining the two tracks of peace negotiations together is that both Madrid and Oslo, though carried out through different delegations and in different locations, were ultimately supervised and led by the same Israeli and Palestinian leaderships that dealt with them as related processes. For practical and methodological reasons, the chapter will be divided into
sections based on the areas emphasized by the various writers. The chapter will demonstrate that the existing literature examines three aspects of the peace processes: the actual processes of negotiation and their structures; the outcomes of the negotiations, and the relative ‘blame’ that could be attached to the Israeli or Palestinian sides – and therefore, implicitly, aspects of leadership – for failures of the peace process. The chapter will argue that, while all three aspects are relevant, there has been a general failure to properly understand the nature of the Palestinian leadership and therefore to appreciate fully the relationship between the three aspects of the process. The currently available literature will be presented here with its weaknesses and strengths in mind, as it explores these select aspects of the Middle East peace process. Generally, the literature leaves the impression that many researchers and
writers approached the peace process by examining where the blame lay for difficulties in the process, and its ultimate failure. Another approach was to concentrate on the role of the major players in the process, with special focus on the Palestinian side and the dynamics of the relationship between the inside and outside leadership. The third approach was to analyze and evaluate the process based on its outcome. In other words, optimists judged the process positively due to the positive aspects of its outcomes, and pessimists (justifiably) deemed the process a failure because of its negative results. In fact, these
writers missed or misunderstood key issues pertaining to the process. One of these inaccuracies appeared in analyses of the relationship between the Palestinian leadership inside and the leadership outside. Most writers presented one in opposition to the other, exaggerating their differences and thereby missing their complementary roles and common denominators. There was also a great deal of misunderstanding about the impact of the process’ structure, and how the various leaderships manoeuvred within this structure. The isolation of the Oslo talks and the absence of third-party terms of reference and transparency played an important role and contributed to its outcome. This aspect was missing in nearly all of the literature. In conclusion, a review of the literature leaves the impression that few authors recognized the actual defects in the process and causes for its failure, such as the isolation of the negotiations and negotiators from actions taken on the ground. In particular, the crucial element of Israel’s settlement expansion gets barely a mention.
