ABSTRACT
In this chapter I wish to discuss the concept involved when I say: “I ought to do so-and-so”, or “I have a moral obligation to do so-and-so”, or “such-and-such an act is morally right”. So far, I have been content to say that the “right” act is that most likely to promote the general good; but this, though I believe it to be true, may be not a definition, but a highly debatable proposition. If you ask “what ought I to do?” and I reply “you ought to do what will probably promote the general good”, I am not telling you the meaning of your question, which you feel that you already know. Your situation is analogous to that of a child who asks “what is bread made of?” and is told “bread is made of flour”. The child is already familiar with bread, and is not asking for a verbal definition of the word “bread”; the answer, therefore, increases his culinary rather than his linguistic knowledge. So it is if I say you ought to pursue the general good: this statement, true or false, is a proposition of ethics, not a verbal proposition such as we have a right to expect from the dictionary.
