ABSTRACT
The April 1996 Sino-Russian strategic partnership has been touted by leaders in Beijing as the “optimal model” for great power relationships in the postCold War era, replacing the archetypal divisive alliance systems of yesteryear (Putin-Hu Joint Statement 2003). While the primary catalyst behind the formal 1996 partnership agreement was rooted in a mutual desire to present a united front against “hegemonic” US and NATO policies in Europe and elsewhere, the ground for the breakthrough was prepared by deft diplomatic footwork during protracted but successful Sino-Soviet/Russian negotiations leading to the delineation of eastern and western boundaries in two agreements in 1991 and 1994. With disputed territorial claims largely settled, SinoRussian cooperation was further propelled by a confluence of shared strategic views on protecting territorial integrity; limiting the translation of American power and influence into policies unfavorable to each country’s interests; formulating mutual opposition to the application of “double standards” in the war against terrorism; and calling for a world that operated according to a multipolar logic. Ironically, both the principal asset and most significant vulnerability at the
core of this relationship come from a mutual alignment of purpose designed to check American global preeminence. The fluctuations in each country’s ties with the United States represent the fulcrum upon which the Sino-Russian bilateral relationship pivots. Since open confrontation with the United States would jeopardize economic development goals, Beijing and Moscow have sought to frustrate US foreign policy goals through mild opposition or reluctant cooperation. China, especially, has chosen a buck-passing strategy whenever possible, allowing others, such as the EU or Russia, to constrain the US. Apart from checking American power and influence in cost-free ways, the partnership has been rooted in a mutually beneficial arms relationship buttressed by growing trade ties and the promotion of security cooperation, particularly in Central Asia. The Shanghai Five consultative mechanism established in 1996 to negotiate
boundary demarcations between China on the one hand, and Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan on the other, began the process of
institutionalized in June 2001 with a treaty establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The Sino-Russian Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, which soon followed in July 2001, provided further evidence of a desire in Beijing and Moscow for a more stable and codified relationship. However, cooperation between the premier land powers of Eurasia and Asia is not without underlying friction at the bilateral level, as Russia is wary about the impact of rising Chinese influence on its regional reach, and China recognizes Russia’s still considerable sway in Central Asia. Thus, regional and bilateral variables affecting this partnership are not negligible and the heavily institutionalized Sino-Russian relationship allows each country to monitor closely the other’s aspirations for regional and global influence. Therefore, an assessment regarding the strategic and/or expedient nature of
the partnership hinges on more than just the role of the United States in global affairs and requires an inquiry into the play of domestic and regional developments. A rupture in Sino-Russian relations through a clash of great power objectives would destabilize large parts of Asia and Eurasia. Both sides have recognized the dangers inherent in confrontation involving two nuclear armed powers and have sought to pursue their long-term goals incrementally and complementarily. Therein lies the possibility for the emergence of cooperative security and economic orders in Asia and Eurasia. The probability of such an outcome depends, however, on the willingness of Moscow and Beijing to accommodate their mutual aspirations for status, security, and prosperity. While China, as a rising global power and the world’s fastest-growing eco-
nomic engine, is often in the driver’s seat in this relationship, Russia’s assets are not insignificant. Moscow’s vast energy and mineral resources, its stillpalpable influence in Central Asia, and its sheer geographical expanse straddling Europe and Asia, pose considerable obstacles to Chinese aspirations for an increased role in Greater Asia, especially in the face of Russian opposition. Thus China needs Russia as much as Russia may need to rely on China for support in its battles against Western encroachment in Eurasia. This chapter examines the complex Sino-Russian strategic partnership in sections dealing successively with (1) the history leading up to the momentous decision of the two countries to hitch their wagons on the road to power; (2) the main elements of important bilateral agreements; (3) the military and economic facets of the relationship; and (4) an assessment of multifaceted Sino-Russian ties.
