chapter  27
The person may constitute a multiplicity of `selves' rather than a unitary self
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Recently, a number of person-centred scholars (for example Keil 1996; Cooper 1999; Mearns and Thorne 2000: 174±189; Mearns 2002 and Warner 2005) have explored what they believe to be the limitations of the classical model of self as unitary and proposed revisions to this. Not all these authors are of exactly the same view but for each of them the notion of `self-plurality' has important rami®cations for practice and requires adaptations to theory. However, it is of particular importance to note that advocates of the `multiple self' model all see this as healthy and normal, not pathological. Cooper (2007: 86±88) presents a helpful discussion of these views and the differences and similarities between them. By way of example, one way in which the idea of a plural self has reached particular prominence is through the work of Mearns (1999, 2002) and Mearns and Thorne (2000, 2007).