Although Rogers (1951: 221±223) does refer to `the clientcentered rationale for diagnosis', this rationale clearly puts the client and the client's experience at the heart of the process. Furthermore, Rogers (pp. 223±225) immediately follows his rationale with `certain objections to psychological diagnosis'. As Mearns (2004: 88±101) explains at length (p. 88), `problemcentered is not person-centered' and (p. 90) although two clients may have the same or similar `problem' (for example, alcoholism), because how they have symbolised their pasts, their ways of experiencing in the present and their visions for the future are different then they are different and their needs from therapy and the therapist are different. Another objection to diagnosis or medicalised categorisation is exempli®ed by Sanders (see, for example, 2006a: 32±39, 2007b: 112±128) who argues that, because it is based on a biological, disease model, the concept of mental illness is inappropriate and oppressive. Sanders (2007b: 119) considers `distress' more relevant than `disease' and sees distress as arising from psychological and social causes rather than biological causes. Sanders (pp. 120±122) goes on to present arguments with respect to psychodiagnosis, stating (p. 122) that
in a sym-are as representing three main views:
1. Psychodiagnosis is irrelevant to person-centred therapy and may actually be harmful.