Rundle (in press) notes that person-centred theory is clear that the need to make sense of experience is so strong that human beings will try, in any way possible, to process it. Also, the self is seen as a process of becoming rather than as a ®xed entity. Thus all behaviours, feelings and ways of being in the world fall along continua. So, one way of looking at `mental illness' is as the best response to their experienced world that the person whose reality is noticeably different from `normal' has at their disposal. Not only that, but there is no great gulf between `madness' and eccentricity (of which we are all capable). In addition, from a person-centred perspective, an experienced altered or different reality is part of a person's experiential ®eld, an experienced way of processing. It does not de®ne who or what they are. For example, Margaret Warner proposes that some unusual ways of being can be accounted for in terms of `dif®cult process' (Point 36). Dif®cult process results when early childhood dif®culties mean important processing capabilities are not developed. Warner's concepts of fragile, dissociated, psychotic and metaphact process (see Warner 2007b: 143±144) are helpful descriptors of ways of being in the world but they are not intended to offer prescriptive diagnoses.