ABSTRACT
Introduction In 1959, Bertrand Russell wrote, ‘During the period since 1914 three philosophers have successively dominated the British philosophical world, first that of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, second that of the Logical Positivists, and third that of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations’ (Hacker 1996: 1).1 Russell’s remark locates Wittgenstein’s influence in a specific time and place; however, the influence of Wittgenstein’s ‘linguistic turn’ is much more far reaching. Wittgenstein’s early work, in the Tractatus, informed the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle. While logical positivism per se is no longer in fashion, the picture theory of language continues to underpin assumptions about hypothesis testing within the social sciences. At the other end of the spectrum, Wittgenstein’s U-turn in the Philosophical Investigations (1958) gave impetus to the postmodern critique of the autonomous rational agent (Honneth 1995). In the middle of this spectrum, his argument that language use is action has influenced social theory more broadly (e.g. Austin 1963; Searle 1969; Berger and Luckmann 1967). The two phases of Wittgenstein’s exploration of language, from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations, have, via the avenues mentioned above, influenced all of the major streams of thinking within International Relations (IR). This influence has been indirect and is not often acknowledged,2 given the allergy to questions of language in IR. This allergy is reflected in realist assumptions that diplomats often lie and thus language can’t be trusted. It is expressed in the assumption that the observations and the categories of the scientist, rather than the language of the subjects of analysis, are what matters. The allergy was perhaps most evident in the distancing of ‘conventional’ constructivists from post-structuralists, who were assumed to deal ‘merely’ with language. It may also be a reflection of the pre-occupation with theory and materiality in IR. There remains a reluctance to embrace fully the significance of the challenge posed by Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Yet, the transition in his thought from a picture theory to a more constitutive notion of language is precisely the transition that has been underway within IR debates for the last twenty years, from the unquestioned assumption, best articulated by Waltz (1979), that theory
mirrors the logic of the international system across time, to the ‘constructivist turn’, and the greater attention to cultural difference, meaning, context and processes of constitution and change (Fierke 2002). Wittgenstein’s argument was primarily about the nature of language. One important theme is the tendency to become blinded by our language use and the need to look at this use from a different angle, in order to see more clearly how it constitutes human action and meaning. While useful for a critique of theory, and the assumptions contained within it, or for the analysis of meaning in use, this perspective is not particularly useful for – nor, arguably, compatible with – the formulation of second-order theory. Wittgenstein argued that there is neither a need to deduce nor to explain because, far from being hidden, everything is open to view in our language (Wittgenstein 1973 [1958]: para. 126). That which is most important to us is hidden only because of its simplicity and familiarity – we cannot see it because it is constantly before our eyes (1973: para. 129). In what follows, I examine the application and potential contribution of Wittgenstein’s thought to IR. In the first part of the chapter, I explore the explanation/understanding dichotomy as contrasted with Wittgenstein’s imperative to analyse meaning in use. In the second, I explore his potential contribution to the field.
