ABSTRACT
Biological weapons are devices for the malevolent infliction of disease. Using biological weapons, a small group of haters can spread illness, perhaps at catastrophic levels, perhaps on a global scale. Moreover, these weapons mutate due to the accelerating pace of scientific advance; tomorrow it will be slightly easier to use biological weapons than it is today. The notion that no one will ever use such capabilities is simply untenable. At the root of the matter is an existential challenge: scientific progress is intertwined with escalating malevolence threatening human security. Progressing capabilities improve our lives and yet, inextricably, enable the development of weapons that are truly harmful weapons to humanity. While it is difficult to judge when this danger will strike, there should be no doubt
that we are vulnerable to an attack. Attackers can choose from many disease agents and many dispersal modes, and they can hit targets anywhere in the world. Preparing and executing the attack can be done anonymously; the outbreak might initially be seen as natural. An attack with a contagious agent can spread through time and space; potentially imperilling everyone. These dangers of biological weapons do not argue for slowing scientific progress, but they undercut notions that new challenges can be effectively addressed with yesterday’s policies. This chapter briefly introduces the background for biological weapons security policy.
It is followed by an overview of the likely agents and methods of use as weapons. The third section discusses the states and groups that have developed biological weapons and considers who might pose future threats and why. The fourth and fifth sections are devoted to a discussion of security strategies for reducing biological weapons dangers focusing on a critique of the existing policy framework and offering a summary of policy pillars that can augment security.
