ABSTRACT
This book is about the problem of ‘exceptionalism’ – ‘exceptional’ political practices legitimated by claims about ‘exceptional’ events and ‘exceptional’ circumstances. The previous chapters dealt with two initial aspects of this problem: first, the contradictions of the popular liberal discourse regarding ‘exceptional’ politics and questions of liberty and security; and, second, the more sophisticated treatment of these contradictions found in the political theory of Hobbes and Kant. The aim of this chapter is to explain and critique the workings of Schmitt’s
exceptionalism. Although many of Schmitt’s ideas can be read as unique, the aim here is to show that much of Schmitt grows from an entirely conventional political discourse. Indeed, the aim of the previous two chapters was to try to counter the idea of Schmitt as a political aberration by establishing that he grows out of a tradition rather than simply appearing in opposition to it.
