ABSTRACT
Epistemology is a different subject than those of metaphysics and of the philosophy of language. All the same, there are important links between, on the one hand, what’s evidence for what and, on the other, the right account of certain properties. The reason for this is obvious. Whether or not something is evidence for the possession of property F is a function in part of what F is. Something looking square is a reason for holding that it is square; it is not a reason for holding that there will soon be peace in the Middle East, and the difference lies in part in the difference between the property of being square and the property of peace being imminent in the Middle East. Someone having red hair is not a (good) reason for increasing one’s expectation that he or she is hot tempered but is a reason for increasing one’s expectation that they have Nordic ancestry. Again, the reason for the difference in support lies in part in the nature of the two properties in question.
