ABSTRACT
The main objective of this chapter is to trace the emergence and development of the discourse on the democratization of the Arab world in recent years. The purpose is not to record every twist and turn in the course of that debate, but to depict those distinguishing features that characterized the various stages of its evolution and progress. Ultimately, it is the intention of this modest attempt to contribute to finding an explanation for the failure of the majority of Arab societies in achieving a reasonable level of public participation in the political sphere. The absence of political constituencies, let alone democratic constituencies,
is very often ignored in favor of explanations that tend to view Islamic heritage, Arab culture, lack of modern political institutions, and the social atomization of Arab societies as impediments to democratization. In this chapter, a serious attempt is made to refocus the debate on the
political constituency as a necessary condition for initializing any progress toward democracy. Egypt and Palestine are used as two examples illustrating the importance of the existence of political constituencies, or their absence, in the evolution or inhibition of the success of political representation. In essence, it is neither the debate among ruling elites and intellectuals
detached from the bulk of society, nor the imposition of formal measures even by force by outside powers that in the final analysis creates a democratic environment in the Arab world. The likelihood of such an occurrence could take place when genuine political constituencies appear on the scene and pave the way for the emergence of vibrant political life in Arab societies. The political discourse among a great number of academics, politicians, and
journalists in the Arab world as well as the West has recently become oversaturated with opinions, views, and determined obsessions with the necessity of democratizing the Arab countries. Guests from Europe and the US sponsored by their governments and embassies have become frequent travelers to the region, often stopping in Arab capitals to lecture or preach on the wisdom and benefits of adopting democracy. Arab intellectuals are increasingly finding themselves carried away by this new drive and sharing heatedly in the
debate. Officials of Arab governments, despite their reservations, are being forced into a discussion in which they pay lip service to the new popular theme. The concept of democracy, the notions of participation, and the fashionable concept of women in politics are being celebrated on every occasion in a similar fashion to the way Muslim communities celebrate their traditional festivities in their annual Moulids. The Egyptians, with their sharp sense of humor, have coined a very expressive term to describe such a phenomenon. They call it a “Hoga.” In a recent article in the Ahram newspaper, an Egyptian intellectual, Dr. Abdel Aziz Hammouda, defined Hoga as a sudden upsurge which surfaces for a while, and then as quickly disappears, leaving behind no trace at all. Its underlying causes persist without any change, but the Hoga itself passes away as if it has not been there.1 In a sense, the Arab world is experiencing today the Hoga of democracy forced upon it by forces from outside. However, the fact that the discourse has become oversaturated, and that
some of those contributing to it have ulterior political motives should not detract from some of the serious attempts that have been made at the level of theory and practice. It might be true that many intellectuals and government officials are
joining the debate to be part of the new fashion, despite the fact that they may know it may not last too long. Nevertheless, it is important for them to keep a high profile, exhibit their input, and claim that they have a contribution to make to the subject. From their point of view, this is professionalism and survival. It does not matter if they discover later that they have to abandon the discourse and adopt a new more popular one. This is part of being up to date, open-minded, and changing with the times. Even when a discourse becomes repetitive, the ideas redundant, and the outcome at the level of political practice negligible, the momentum has to be maintained without much concern for where it is going or what it seeks to accomplish. Yet there are those who believe that, once a discourse reaches its intellectual and political limits, it loses its raison d’être, and it is time to reconsider its validity. In a discussion on democracy in the Arab world, the time has come to
evaluate what the intellectual and political communities have actually achieved, and assess the course that should be taken to promote the debate to a higher level, or abandon it altogether until such time that it might become more relevant to the Arab setting. Since 1967, the democratic discourse in the Arab world seems to have
passed through three distinct stages of development. The first was largely influenced by the aftermath of the Arab defeat. It came at the heels of a national tragedy which shook the roots of Arab societies. The second appeared in the late 1980s and gathered momentum throughout the 1990s, with a strong European involvement in the area of civil society. The third and last phase was initiated by pressures from the outside, particularly the US, soon after September 11.
