The plan of this chapter is to re-examine and to generalize a certain line of objection against expressivism, a line prominently taken by Searle (1969) and Geach (1960, 1965). I shall return to my previous examples and discuss expressivism about morals, taste and probability. The outcome of my re-examination will be that expressivists of these sorts must give up truth-conditional semantics across the board (not just for the problematic sentences). In § 1 I very briefly introduce expressivism about morals, about taste and about probability. In §2 I discuss the difficulties Searle and Geach raised for expressivism, and in §3 I consider how they could be circumvented. In §4 I use and generalize an argument by Bob Hale (1986) to show that any expressivist semantics for the problematic sentences must be extended to cover all sentences for reasons of grammatical uniformity. In §5 I discuss how this uniformity could be achieved. Finally, in §6, I put this result into perspective and draw my conclusion from the point of view of the problem of excess objectivity.