ABSTRACT
This book concerns the European Union and the European security order. More specifically, it sets out to analyse the role and position of the EU in relation to countries that are part of the European security order but are not EU members, recognized candidate states, or voluntary opt-outs. The background rationale is provided by the notion of the regional security complex, as developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. In their analytical framework, different complexes can attain different character in terms of security relationship. As far as the European complex is concerned, the EU is the undisputed leader and the complex internally holds such a high quality that it approximates Karl Deutsch’s notion of a security community, in which the use of military force is no longer considered for conflict resolution. This book is in general agreement with the Buzan and Wæver characterization – here the ambition is to study interaction between the EU and different countries that are adjacent to the EU but belong to other complexes (the post-Soviet and the Middle East and North African ones, and including the United States as a global great power). In order to study this interaction from a relational point of view, the book develops an analytical framework based in constructivism and rationalism, focusing the notions of interfaces and recognition. The general logic is as follows: An interface consists of the mutual recognition of two or more actors. Recognition denotes the process through which actors establish their dispositions vis-à-vis other actors. The process comprises three analytically different elements: self-image, perception of the other, and of context. In that process, material and ideational resources of actors become decisive. Interfaces vary according to two dimensions, the degree of value compatibility and the character of relational power, distinguishing between symmetrical and asymmetrical power relationships. A range of different conclusions result from the analyses in the preceding chapters. In what follows, a number of empirical conclusions are discussed, after which a few reflections of theoretical and methodological nature are shared. A summary of the findings is shown in Table 8.1. A number of reflections and comments can be made at this point. As far as great power interfaces are concerned, two conclusions can be observed. The first concerns the qualitative difference of the two interfaces under study here. The
EU-US interface can be characterized as a community interface, in which there is a high degree of value compatibility, in terms of democracy, rule of law, human rights, and also as regards conduct in international relations. This in turn explains the close external cooperation in the field of security. Although the means have certainly been, and still remain to some extent, different for the two, the goals and ambitions are mostly the same. In contrast, the EU-Russian interface is a case of a hostility interface, in which value incompatibility leads to instrumental interaction (but not isolation) rather than strengthening the common ground. This difference serves as one possible explanation for the difference in degree of institutionalization of cooperation, to the effect that EU-Russian interaction needs a higher degree of detailed regulation. The second set of conclusions takes as its point of departure the observation that both interfaces encompass power symmetry in terms of relational power. There is a fundamental difference between the two interfaces, however, to the effect that whereas the EU-US interface is internally symmetrical largely due to a lack of power projection, the EU-Russian interface is symmetrical because both parties try to project power but do not succeed, and furthermore realize the interdependent nature of their relationship. As a consequence of the power symmetry, it follows that the EU is perceived by both the United States and Russia as a great power in the security sphere. It is significant, however, that in the American perception, the EU is primarily a partner in dealing with external issues, whereas the Russian perception is predominantly about EU ambitions of normative superiority – projecting productive power – in the European security order as well as on a global scale. As far as the neighbourhood interfaces are concerned, they all share the characteristic that the EU is the markedly stronger power. However, there is variation in the degree to which the EU is able to project power as well as regarding what power resources it possesses. In a few cases – Belarus, Syria, Libya – the EU is fundamentally unable to induce (or force) change, as far as can be seen at this point in time, despite its superiority in financial, technical and normative terms. Moreover, it cannot take advantage of the institutional means it has set up, for instance in the form the ENP. The EU has a hard time realizing its power potential in these cases. In contrast, in most interfaces, the weaker party is adapting to EU values as well as practices, although in different ways partly depending on the capacity of the state in question, which may be linked to the level of democratic development.
