ABSTRACT
The very occurrence of voluntary — ad hoc or optional — referendums in democracies poses a theoretical puzzle. As Setälä (1999: 330) puts it, ‘At first sight, the interests behind ad hoc or optional referendums cannot be regarded as “policy maximizing,” because the parliamentary majority required to introduce a referendum is normally also sufficient to pass the proposal submitted to a referendum.’ Should we expect the political elite, and especially elected politicians, to forgo their hard-earned special democratically authorized and legitimized decision-making power? Should we expect elected politicians — each representing tens of thousands of voters — to equalize their weight in decision making to that of ordinary citizens? That is, should we expect the members of the political elite to initiate a referendum? The answer, it seems, is ‘no’. Indeed, ad hoc and optional referendums are rather rare; in most democracies, at most times and in most cases, political elites seem to be able to settle their differences without including the masses in the decision-making process. Yet there are instances in which members of the elite do call for a referendum. Why? What is it that makes them ready to relinquish their special representative status?
