ABSTRACT
In this chapter we present two analytical frameworks that, respectively, seek to improve the way in which donor countries can effectively engage fragile states on the one hand, and evaluate the effectiveness of that engagement on the other. The chapter unfolds in four sections. In the first section we examine the merits of developing long-term planning procedures imbedded in government decisionmaking structures. In the second part we present a framework for determining how and where resources can be allocated. In the third part we present an impact evaluation framework. In the fourth and final part we conclude with implications. Our argument is twofold. First, policymakers will be persuaded to use relevance, impact, and evaluation capabilities only if it means they will be able to do their job better and perhaps more efficiently. As we have shown in previous chapters, the policy community might be best served by thinking of early warning and risk analysis as mechanisms for the monitoring of long-term processes, both structural and dynamic, in which conflict is but one of many features of fragility. Simply put, failed and fragile state policies are often not informed by shared, regular broad-based situation analyses. Where analysis is factored into programming, it is often a “one-off” in-house exercise that is not shared across departments or between governments and agencies. Given the dynamic and complex nature of fragility, systematic and regular monitoring and analysis in combination with structural risk assessments are prerequisites for appropriate and sustainable action. Second, and related to the first point, the impact of engaging in a fragile state is often reduced or not understood because of a lack of coordination and coherent strategy. Frequently, key actors (NGOs, governments, multilateral organizations, civil society groups, etc.) operate in isolation or do not coordinate activities across sectors.1 This isolation and absence of coordination often results from a lack of common analysis and the lack of multi-agency planning forums for the development of joint strategies.2 With these two points in mind, the fundamental challenges for any analytical tool are both long and short-term planning as well as impact assessment capabilities and their full integration into government structures at the highest levels.3 To quote a decade-old
assessment on the subject within the Canadian context, the tasks are fairly straightforward:
Within Canada the heretofore invisibility of the preventive impact of development work may be due largely to the attitudinal propensity to consider prevention a facet of development activity and not an end in itself. The long term choice for Canadian policy makers is to push for a better understanding of the root causes of conflict and relate aid directly to preventive initiatives. The implication is that development programming and project initiatives will have to be done differently if their preventive impacts are to be anticipated and assessed. It is no longer enough to hope for a conflict prevention spin-off of a development activity. Under this option, risk analysis would be linked more thoroughly to policy planning through a five step process. First, because risk assessment data and information must satisfy the needs of different agencies there is a need to more closely integrate them into routinized foreign policy activities of the various departments engaged in foreign and security policy. Second, integration means that assessments are used to identify not only future risks but also to identify links between conflict processes and identifiable focal points of activity in which the end user is engaged. Assessments should be able to identify a sequence of events that are logically consistent with operational responses. Third, the end user, be he or she a representative of DFAIT, CIDA or DND, should be able to use the information in a way that helps them plan for contingencies. In essence, the goal is to establish a risk assessment chain that is multi-departmental, multi-purpose and multi-directional. Fourth, measurements of effectiveness need to be harmonized within Canada and across states. As structured databases will continue to be an important tool despite their imperfections, the current situation of decentralized data holding will only be able to function if the information handling systems-including indicators-in the different countries are harmonized. Fifth and finally, an essential step in moving the Canadian government toward a forward-looking preventive approach would be to establish a research bureau under a conflict prevention secretariat. Its central tasks would be liaison between the relevant policy areas, the promotion and study of knowledge, and the forging of intergovernmental and nongovernmental links. In the context of global developments, the bureau’s risk assessments of structural causes of conflict will be as pertinent as first-hand information of a likely civil war or humanitarian disaster. Since many of today’s conflicts stem from underlying social or economic causes, practical research would focus on the development and dissemination of knowledge about internal economic and social developments as well as of the state of political or international relations. A second task of the bureau would be to assist practitioners in the fieldbe they peacekeepers or NGOs-to develop specific analytical skills, risk assessment techniques and most importantly, conflict resolution capacity.
