ABSTRACT
Since its publication in 1957, Samuel Huntington’s seminal work, The Soldier and the State, has set the terms of debate about civil-military relations, and is commonly regarded as the ‘normal’ theory of the field, albeit a theory that has also been heavily criticized (Cohen 2002: 226). Huntington sees professional armed forces as a precondition for military effectiveness. The ‘military professional’ includes a professional ethic that can be described as an ideal set of universal values and capabilities that are ‘pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power oriented, nationalistic, militaristic, pacifist, and instrumentalist in its view of the military profession’. However, the most important feature of the military professional is that he or she is an objective and apolitical servant of the state, and, therefore, by definition subordinate to the political leadership (Huntington 1957: 79). Huntington’s conception of military professionalism assumes that it is possible to segregate an autonomous area of military science from political purpose. The autonomous military science, contrasted with the view of politics as art, is based on the functional imperative – to fight and win the nation’s wars – as a
structural given. The quality of the military can, therefore, according to Huntington, only be evaluated in terms of independent military standards, defined by the functional imperative, and should not be related to the political end for which it fights (1957: 56). As Huntington separates military means from political ends, the ideal purpose and identity of all armed forces become universal. The purpose of the military is national defence and its identity will, without interference from the political leadership or other societal imperatives, automatically be adjusted to fit this purpose through the development of military professionalism. Huntington thereby advocates the radical tradition of military professionalism, which emphasizes the isolation and autonomy of the military. It requires military obedience to civil authorities but, at the same time, allows complete military control over internal organizational matters (Larson 1974). The armed forces’ functional imperative in fighting wars and the resulting requirements this has placed upon the military have meant that, most often, a distinct military culture is formed. This professional culture is often perceived as threatening to civil society. Thus, an often-discussed problem is the extent to which the armed forces can be allowed to differ from the surrounding society (Dandeker and Gow 2000). Deliberate attempts by the political leadership to incorporate the values of civil society into the armed forces in order to control them are what Huntington called ‘subjective control’. This form of political meddling in military affairs would, according to Huntington (1957), not only engage the armed forces in politics and, thereby, affect civilian control, but also decrease its fighting capabilities. Huntington argued that the military values feared by civil society are the very values that ensure civilian control and create military effectiveness. This is because the professional warrior values of conservative realism, self-sacrifice and being apolitical come from civilian noninterference in military affairs. If these values of military professionals are reduced, military effectiveness will also decrease. Huntington’s suggestion of how to achieve civilian control of the armed forces in democracies is, therefore, unsurprisingly, through civilian recognition and support of military professionalism and expertise, meaning no political interference in the military sphere (1957: 83). Huntington calls this ‘objective civilian control’, which, in practice, means a sharp division of labour between political ends and military means, as well as the idea that the military should be physically and ideologically separated from political institutions (Schiff 1995: 7). Peter Feaver summarizes Huntington’s argument as ‘autonomy leads to professionalization, which leads to political neutrality and voluntary subordination, which leads to secure civilian control’ (2003: 18). A military organization well separated from the political leadership in a conservative civilian society will, therefore, according to Huntington, both be well adjusted for its purpose and under democratic civilian control. In paraphrasing Feaver, Huntington’s causal chain regarding effectiveness would be: autonomy leads to professionalization, which leads to structural and cultural adjustment to the functional imperative, which automatically means military effectiveness. While Huntington’s work has become the normal, and most accepted, theory
of civil-military relations, a parallel track has always existed in the sociological school of the field. The school, led by Morris Janowitz, instead advocates civilmilitary integration in order to achieve both effectiveness and civilian control. By adding a political dimension to the military profession, Janowitz suggested that the military professional must be ‘sensitive to the political and social impact of the military establishment on international security affairs’. Civilian control cannot be achieved solely through the rule of law and a professional tradition not to intervene in politics, but must also come from ‘self-imposed professional standards and meaningful integration with civilian values’ (Janowitz 1960: 420). The practical solution to creating a professional military organization fit for purpose is thus the opposite to that of Huntington; the military should be integrated with the political leadership in order to develop increased political understanding and sensitivity. Importantly, the political leadership must control both the criteria and information for judging the effectiveness of the military establishment. ‘The formulation of the standards of performance the military are expected to achieve are civilian responsibilities, although these standards cannot be evolved independent of professional military judgement’ (Janowitz 1960: 420). In other words, the interpretation of the functional imperative and the consequent military adjustment should be controlled by the political leadership rather than by objective external factors, or by the military itself. This school further argues that an integrated civil-military structure is a means of improving the process of strategic analysis and planning, thereby increasing effectiveness in operations (Strachan 2006; Brooks 2008). Brooks uses two causal variables in what she calls ‘preference divergence’ in the civilmilitary interface and in the power relations between the political and military leaderships (Brooks 2008: 23, 27). To achieve effective strategic assessment, both military and political leaders must, according to Brooks, ‘participate fully in comprehensive dialogue at the apex of decision making to expose flawed reasoning, hidden and contradictory assumptions, and alternative views in the analytical process’ of strategic assessment and planning. Ideally, and despite structural factors that are often working against it, military and political leaders should, therefore, be actively engaged with one another (Brooks 2008: 269-270). Another significant argument is that integrated formal government and/or ministerial committee system should be used to support consensus-building procedures among the civil authorities, military leaders, and senior public servants (Bland 2001). Such an interagency system should ideally permit military and civilian leaders to develop co-ordinated advice for ministers. In the end, such coordinated advice produces policies that better command military support and loyalty, and thus simplify policy implementation (Bland 2001). This stands in stark contrast to the divided approach, which emphasizes the importance of pure military, as well as political advice. In conclusion, the indirect impact means that the nature of civil-military relations is likely to have an impact on the size, structure, and equipment of the armed forces, which in turn affects the operational effectiveness of those forces.
