ABSTRACT
In Bayle’s eyes it is the theory of occasionalism that constitutes Malebranche’s most important contribution to modern philosophy. Bayle’s early works offer a spirited defense of the occasionalist account of causation, the arguments for which “scarcely admit of reply” (OD IV, 138). This is not to say that even at this early stage Bayle considered occasionalism to be entirely free of diffi culty. As early as 1679, Bayle had raised several acute objections to Poiret’s version of the thesis. Toward the end of his life, Bayle’s attitude was even more complex. Bayle remained suffi ciently convinced of the soundness of the occasionalist position to declare:
I am persuaded that just as God alone can move bodies, it is God alone who can communicate ideas to our soul. It is not the cause of them; it does not know how to arouse them. It has ones that it would like not to have. . . . It is therefore God who communicates to us the idea we have of him. (OD III, 341a-b)1
In general, however, Bayle’s tone in these later works is one of diffi dence and circumspection. Thus, in a discussion of the problem of mind-body interaction, Bayle observes that although the occasionalist solution “is subject to unfortunate drawbacks, nevertheless it seems to me that it is the only one that can be given” (OD III, 940b). Elsewhere he is even more cautious, characterizing the theory as simply “preferable to the common hypothesis” (OD III, 789b).
