ABSTRACT
Years of Soviet bureaucratic secrecy and silence surrounded the events of the workers’ uprising in Novocherkassk, which took place from 1 to 3 June 1962. It was not until May 1989 that any investigation into the tragic means used to end the uprising was undertaken from within the Soviet bureaucratic system. After the implementation of Gorbachev’s reforms, and the election of the Congress of Peoples’ Deputies, opinions were voiced to open an investigation into the events of June 1962. It was under those auspices that the Chief Military Procurator of the Soviet Union carried out the investigation into the Novocherkassk tragedy over the next several years. Shrouded in secrecy, the uprising in Novocherkassk is an important case study of internal policies in the Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchev. It is the specific task of this study to examine the role of the Soviet armed forces during the Novocherkassk uprising. We know that Soviet Army units of the North Caucasian Military District (NCMD) were sent to Novocherkassk, along with internal troop units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). This study attempts to discover the extent of the role played by standing army troops in suppressing the uprising on 2 June 1962. Did the standing army fire into the crowd gathered on Lenin Square or was that action carried out by troops of the MVD? The second question that this study addresses is the development of military
professionalism within the Soviet Armed Forces and the impact of this on the actions of the Soviet military during the events in Novocherkassk. Did the actions of Soviet army officers represent their understanding of military professionalism? Had the Soviet armed forces developed a strong sense of professionalism, with the military as a professional caste, since the death of Stalin? In a study published in 1983, William Fuller, Jr. stated that the Soviet army
was not assigned the duty to control internal disputes that arose between the Communist Party and the Soviet government on one hand and the population on the other. He does, however, state that the internal troops of the MVD were tasked with carrying out an internal function ‘relating to the control of dissatisfied elements in the population’.1 Contrary to the work of Fuller is that of William Odom, specialist in civil-military relations in the Soviet Union. Odom, in his work on the disintegration of the Soviet armed forces, states that ‘during the entire post-1945 period, the Soviet military conducted
combat operations almost exclusively against the peoples inside the Soviet camp’, and that an integral function of the regular military was the ‘maintenance of communist parties’ rule in countries where they already held power’.2 Odom proceeds to state that the Soviet army was used as reinforcement for the internal troops of the MVD to put down domestic uprisings and protests in the Soviet Union, giving as an example Novocherkassk in 1962.3
How to evaluate these studies, which show polar opposites on the role of the military at Novocherkassk, is the primary task of this study. However, pinpointing the exact role of the regular military at Novocherkassk is difficult. A primary hindrance to any study of the Soviet military is a lack of primary documentation, especially from the Central Military Archives held outside Moscow at Podolsk. Military information must, therefore, be accessed from those archives of the Communist Party and the state that are available for research. Given the status of archival work on defence and military issues in the Russian Federation, it may never be possible to pinpoint exactly the role of the Soviet army during the Novocherkassk uprising in 1962; however, through those primary sources currently available, coupled with the secondary sources concerning the subject, this study sheds light on a period of Soviet history that warrants greater evaluation. Dilemmas arise when researching Novocherkassk. Files pertaining to the trials
following the uprising are easily accessible; however, those of the Ministry of Defense or the General Staff are inaccessible, particularly to Western scholars. Documents that would provide insight into the operations of the Soviet armed forces in connection with the uprising in Novocherkassk have not yet been made available. The lack of primary documentation from the Soviet military is a problem when researching events in Novocherkassk; the problem will not be solved in the foreseeable future as access to this material remains closed. All information concerning the role of the military in Novocherkassk is in the form given by those military personnel who were present in June 1962. Nevertheless, there is the possibility that these sources are biased in order to skew the events in order to present the interviewee in a better light. The workers’ uprising at Novocherkassk arose from a myriad of reasons.
On 17 May 1962, the Central Committee approved a Council of Minister’s proposal to raise the state purchase and sale price of basic foodstuffs, such as meat, milk and butter. Beginning on 1 June, the prices of meat and poultry were to increase by 35 per cent, while the prices of milk and butter were to increase by 25 per cent.4
