What were they thinking? Think tanks, the Bush presidency and US foreign policy

Decades from now, when historians and political scientists look back at the turbulent years of the Bush presidency, they will undoubtedly ask – what were they thinking? What was President Bush thinking when he ordered the invasion of Iraq? What advice were his closest advisers – Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleeza Rice and Colin Powell – giving him as insurgents in and around Baghdad were wreaking havoc on US and allied soldiers? And what, if any, role did policy experts brainstorming at the nation’s leading defense and foreign policy think tanks play in advising the Bush administration on how to establish a more stable world order? Until the memoirs of leading policy-makers involved in Bush’s inner circle and the

briefing notes summarizing high-level meetings between the president and his principal advisers become available, one can only speculate on what ultimately influenced the Bush administration’s decision to resort to force. Moreover, until this and other relevant information surfaces, it will be difficult to confirm why, in the face of considerable public opposition, the president sacrificed thousands of lives and billions of dollars to fight an unpopular and inherently destabilizing war. Although it may take years to piece together an accurate and complete assessment of what led to this foreign policy debacle, it is nonetheless possible to shed light on some of the key domestic influences on US foreign policy during the Bush years. In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, the American and foreign media, hundreds

of interest groups and several other non-state and non-governmental organizations took part in the national conversation over the war on terror. While a study detailing the involvement of these and other actors in the foreign policy-making process would most certainly raise critical questions about the impact of ideas on the Bush administration, in this chapter we will focus solely on how one set of institutions – think tanks – sought to leave an indelible mark on US foreign policy. In doing so, we can further explore how policy experts – who are neither appointed, or elected to public office – can become important actors in the foreign policy-making process. The aim of this chapter is not to chronicle the evolution of think tanks in the United

States, nor is it to engage in a lengthy discussion about the different types of think tanks that populate the policy-making community. These and other issues related to the growth and diversity of American think tanks have been addressed elsewhere (Abelson 1996, 2002, 2006; Rich 2004). Rather, the purpose here is to address what clearly has become a major shortcoming in the burgeoning literature on think tanks. Although scholars who study think tanks in the United States and in other

industrialized and developing countries have gone to great lengths to explain how and under what circumstances these organizations become involved in policy-making (Stone 1996; McGann and Weaver 2000; Stone and Denham 2004), the majority of studies have neglected to consider how to assess or evaluate their impact. As a result, although we know far more about the types of think tanks that have emerged in recent years and the various public and private channels on which they rely to market their ideas (Weaver 1989; Abelson 1996, 2002), the extent to which they are able to wield influence at different stages of the policy-making process largely remains cloaked in mystery. In an effort to address this deficiency, this chapter will explore how a small group of

think tanks sought to influence US defense and foreign policy during the Bush administration. Particular emphasis will be placed on how the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) were able to share their insights on how to wage war in Iraq and in other conflict-ridden countries with key advisers in the Bush White House. While there is little doubt that think tanks specializing in defense and foreign policy

made a concerted effort to influence President Bush’s thinking during his tumultuous terms in office, it is important to clarify how and under which circumstances they appeared to have had an impact. For instance, shortly after the United States invaded Iraq, journalists in North America and in Europe claimed that the Project for the New American Century had in effect become the architect of Bush’s foreign policy. However, as the war progressed, it appeared that scholars at AEI may have played an even more important role in convincing the Bush administration not only to stay the course in Iraq, but to increase the number of troops being deployed. Support for the ‘surge’ in Iraq has been closely linked to several projects undertaken at AEI. Still, as tempting as it may be to make sweeping claims about how influential some

think tanks are in official policy-making circles, scholars must be better equipped to analyze the nature and degree of their involvement. As we will discover in the pages that follow, some think tanks have been able to make important contributions to foreign policy by generating timely and policy relevant studies that promote lively discussion and debate among key stakeholders. In doing so, they have made great strides in informing and educating the public and policy-makers about how to meet the many challenges confronting them in the twenty-first century. However, it will become equally apparent that establishing close ties to high-level decision-makers does not guarantee that think tanks will be able to achieve policy influence. Unless and until policy-makers are prepared to listen to their advice, there is little think tanks can do to translate policy recommendations into concrete public policy. For think tanks to succeed in the marketplace of ideas, policy-makers on Capitol Hill, in the White House and throughout the bureaucracy, must be prepared to trust their judgement. Otherwise, scholars residing at think tanks will be left to debate among themselves and members of the attentive public about the virtues and vices of US foreign policy. In the first section of the chapter, a brief discussion of the many methodological

obstacles scholars need to address in studying think tank influence will be provided. This will be followed by a detailed case study of how PNAC and a handful of other conservative think tanks attempted to influence both policy discussions and public debates over the war on terror. Finally, we will discuss why it is important to understand the management style of presidents in any assessment of think tank influence at the highest levels of government.