ABSTRACT
The founded acts analysed by us in select examples were considered by us to be intuitions, and intuitions of the new types of object that they brought to light, objects which can only be given in founded acts of a sort and form which corresponds to each of them. The explanatory value of this extended use of the concept Intuition can only lie in the fact that we are not here dealing with some inessential, merely disjunctive widening of a concept, which permits us to extend the sphere of that concept over the spheres of any heterogeneous concepts whatsoever, 1 but with an authentic generalization, which rests on a community of essential features. We call the new acts 'intuitions' in that, with a mere surrender of a 'straightforward' relation to their object — the peculiar sort of immediacy defined by us as 'straightforwardness' — they yet have all the essential peculiarities of intuitions: we find in their case the same essential divisions, and they show themselves capable of achieving the same fully performed fulfilments. This last mentioned capacity is particularly important for our purposes, for it was with a view to such performances that this whole investigation has been conducted. Knowledge as the unity of fulfilment is not achieved on a mere basis of straightforward acts, but in general, on a basis of categorial acts: when, accordingly, we oppose intuition to thought (as meaning), we cannot mean by 'intuition' merely sensuous intuition.
