ABSTRACT
As India’s lone overseas counterinsurgency (COIN) experience, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka offers a rich area of analysis from the perspective of the United States. Being fellow democracies that value the rule of law, human rights, and military subordination to civilian control, India and the United States face similar challenges when confronted with a tenacious insurgency in areas more or less alien to their respective national cultures. At the strategic and operational levels, the issues include adapting military doctrines to COIN; designing flexible military and governmental structures or organizations to support COIN, without detracting from the ability to accomplish “conventional” missions; preparing for overseas actions that might involve combating insurgents; and adjudging the timing of COIN operations from initiation to conclusion. A host of tactical concerns also exist, such as interacting with hostile, uncertain, or intimidated local populations; conducting elections; engaging in reconstruction or civic action projects; supporting civil administration; and undertaking small unit operations. This chapter cannot address all these issues, but it outlines implications in
doctrine, structure, strategy, and operations where the United States would benefit from a deeper understanding of the Indian military’s intervention in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 1990.2 As the United States will, for the foreseeable future, have to retain and hone COIN skills as part of its repertoire in out-of-area theaters, this chapter attempts to lay a foundation for further U.S.–India bilateral exchange on the countries’ respective experiences in confronting insurgencies.
