ABSTRACT
Ancient and medieval foundationalism fares better, since it allows perceptual beliefs about physical objects to be properly basic. Nevertheless, Plantinga argues, these positions continue to make beliefs about the past and beliefs about other persons irrational (Plantinga 1983: 60). Notice that this response does not beg the question against the evidentialist objector. That is, the response does not assume that beliefs about God can be properly
basic, or even that they can be rational at all. Rather, it insists that the conditions for rationality laid down by classical foundationalism are too strict by almost anyone’s lights, because they discredit non-religious beliefs that almost anyone thinks are rational. Here we witness a common dialectic in the Reformed epistemology literature: it is argued that, if a particular objection against the rationality of religious beliefs were sound, it would make other, non-religious beliefs irrational as well. And therefore, if one is to conclude that religious beliefs are irrational on the basis of the objection in question, then one must conclude that the other beliefs are irrational as well. Of course, one might accept that result, embracing a kind of skepticism that goes well beyond beliefs about God. But that would be a hollow victory against the rationality of religious beliefs in particular.
