ABSTRACT
In light of Wittgenstein’s thoughts on the purpose of philosophy, we should proceed with caution as we turn to consider his comments on what shows itself. As we shall see in the following discussion of Max Black’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s thoughts on showing, the reference to what is shown as a thing of any kind blurs the sharp distinctions Wittgenstein attempts to make between what can and cannot be said. We begin with Black’s distinction between the passages on showing in the 4’s and those that fall in the 5’s and 6’s. Next, we shall consider Stenius’ attempt to show that a contradiction exists between the account of showing at 4.121, which suggests there is only one kind of showing, and the account at 4.022, in which he believes two kinds of showing are found. The fi rst purpose of this chapter is to show that if “what cannot be said” is taken at face value, the distinction between what is shown and what shows itself cannot be established. As we saw in the fi rst three chapters, this distinction is the key to Wittgenstein’s method that seeks to set limits to what can be said. The second purpose is to demonstrate the importance of recognizing the difference between two types of showing: what something displays of itself and what something points to or indicates. This distinction will be important when we consider what shows itself (in the latter sense) as the mystical.
