ABSTRACT
Russell states in his Introduction to the Tractatus that Wittgenstein “manages to say a great deal about what cannot be said” (p. 22). Russell has in mind here the fi nal two passages of the Tractatus where Wittgenstein says that the propositions of his book serve as elucidations, that one who understands his thoughts in the text will recognize them as nonsense (6.54) at which point one will pass over what cannot be said in silence (7). Russell’s concern is that Wittgenstein uses silence as a loophole through the hierarchy of languages, that is, the theory of types we examined in Chapter 4. His second concern is that Wittgenstein takes whole subjects, ethics for example, and places them in a mystical and inexpressible region, yet is capable of expressing his ethical opinions. If Russell’s comments are correct, a second problem for Wittgenstein is that he appears to present a doctrine, while claiming at 4.112 that philosophy is not a doctrine. In the same passage, he states that philosophy is an activity. Wittgenstein intends to engage the reader in an activity that will bring him to the realization that philosophical propositions only add confusion to the problems of philosophy. However, by transcending the propositions that lure one into philosophical discourse, including the propositions of the text, one will come to see the world aright (6.54). In coming to see the world in this way we discover the meaning and signifi cance of Wittgenstein’s claim that what cannot be spoken about must be passed over in silence (7).
