ABSTRACT
The purpose of this chapter is to elucidate Wittgenstein’s thoughts in the Tractatus and Notebooks 1914-1916 on the relationship between the meaning of life and the mystical. Connected with Wittgenstein’s passages on this relationship are his thoughts on God. Given Wittgenstein’s opposition to metaphysical propositions one is surprised to read passages such as “God does not reveal himself in the world” (6.432) and “There are two godheads: the world and my independent I” (NB, 74). Such passages seem to introduce a metaphysical interpretation to the discussion on the mystical and the meaning of life. However, this chapter will consider two arguments that, while elucidating Wittgenstein’s notion of the mystical and the meaning of life, will avoid introducing metaphysics. First, a method that will be referred to as doubt or negative metaphysics will be considered in order to clarify what can and cannot be said. Second, this clarifi cation will lead to a consideration of what appear as metaphysical notions in light of contradictory opposites. This strategy will show that when the relationship between what can and cannot be said is defi ned in terms of contradictory opposites, it is possible to demonstrate the dependent relationship between both, and provide evidence for Wittgenstein’s notion of God and its relationship to the meaning of life and the mystical.
