ABSTRACT
Bertrand Russell’s break with idealism, which gave rise to a philosophy of realism, was based on the notion of self-subsistent objects that are independent of the mind and all other objects. According to Russell, the key point in this belief was the rejection of the idealist’s view that the relationship between objects was internal and not external. As we considered in chapter one, this proved to be the foundation for Russell’s philosophical method that he called the “scientifi c method in philosophy”. Wittgenstein rejects Russell’s method stating it is “simply a retrogression from the method of physics” (Notebooks 1914-1916, NB, 44). This denial of Russell’s method is one part of the base of Wittgenstein’s method. The other is that Wittgenstein thought that a fundamental error among philosophers is that they are concerned with problems that lie outside the limits of language (ibid.). Wittgenstein’s aim was to make clear what can and cannot be said. This aim involved setting limits to the expressions of thought. He thought that by presenting clearly what can be said, what cannot be said would be signifi ed (4.115). While the previous chapter considered the method that would follow if the mystical were taken as the starting point, the purpose of this chapter will be to draw a distinction between Russell’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s thoughts on language and the interpretation presented here that links Wittgenstein’s notion of language to his thoughts on the mystical. In meeting this objective, this chapter will open the key topics to be discussed in the following chapters that will attempt to reach an understanding of Wittgenstein’s thoughts on the mystical.
