ABSTRACT
In the wake of the diplomatic damages caused to China by the Tiananmen Incident after 1989, the government of Jiang Zemin sought to repair relations with Asian neighbours via a series of foreign policy initiatives which came to be known as ‘zhoubian’ (peripheral) diplomacy. This involved attempts to improve international ties with bordering states in the Asia-Pacific region, including those with which China had limited or even non-existent relations.1 As a result, during much of the 1990s Beijing was engaged in improving its Asian relations, settling border and other disputes, and seeking to establish itself as a rising Pacific Rim power more interested in regional cooperation than competition. Beijing’s reasons for launching zhoubian diplomacy at this time are manifold. Primarily,
the Chinese government wanted to assure its neighbours that in the wake of Tiananmen the country would not regress into the isolationism of the late Maoist era; nor was it interested in radically challenging the political order in East and Southeast Asia. As well, Beijing wanted to forestall a collective attempt by its neighbours, especially those which were more directly aligned with the West, to restrain or contain China’s growing power in Asia by encircling it with states hostile to Beijing’s regional interests. Third, as China’s economic and diplomatic power began to grow, Beijing sought to convince its smaller neighbours that it was not seeking a hegemonic role in Asia but was interested in becoming an indispensable partner and potential alternative to American-led Western power in the Pacific Rim. Finally, during the 1990s the priorities of the Chinese government included reforms of China’s economic system, which generally involved accelerating market reforms, and to a lesser degree reforming aspects of the party-state in order to modernise it and improve its accountability. Therefore, Beijing sought to create a stable, peaceful periphery to allow China to concentrate on these internal reforms since the country could ill afford to be drawn into regional conflicts as it had been in previous decades. China’s peripheral diplomacy, it can be concluded, has been very successful in achieving
its primary goals. Beijing has resolved many disputes with its neighbours and has adopted a more conservative, diplomatic approach to addressing inter-state differences. With the exception of Taiwan, which did not factor directly in China’s peripheral diplomacy, the chances of a conflict between Beijing and a neighbouring political actor are much lower than in previous decades. Moreover, China’s growing economic power has attracted considerable attention throughout the Pacific Rim, especially after the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis, which resulted in Beijing being perceived as both an island of stability and a helpful partner.2 As American focus in the Pacific Rim from the start of the George
W. Bush administration has been seen as waning in relation to other regions such as the Middle East, China has begun to increase both its soft power and its diplomatic presence in many parts of Asia. For example, it can be argued that China is eclipsing Japan as the most important economy in the Asia-Pacific. As well, as Asian regional organisations have slowly evolved following the end of the Cold War, China’s engagement of them and participation in them are now very carefully scrutinised, further testifying to Beijing’s developing power and capabilities. This does not mean, however, that China has been totally successful in solving all
outstanding problems and issues between itself and its neighbours. Indeed the successes of Chinese peripheral diplomacy have been somewhat unevenly distributed. While Beijing since the turn of the century has begun to engage in more cross-regional diplomacy with states well beyond its immediate milieu (as examined in Chapter 7), many issues remain to be addressed by China’s foreign policy. This chapter will examine four cases of China’s peripheral diplomacy since the 1990s. Two of these, South Korea and Southeast Asia, best illustrate the success of these diplomatic initiatives, while two others, namely Japan and North Korea, underscore the work which still needs to be done by China in improving the security and stability of its frontiers.
