ABSTRACT
Whilst the last chapter concentrated on outlining the ideological and structural limitations of the centre-left parties, this chapter seeks to highlight how such rigidities have been interpreted by key voter groups. Three caseswill be referred to. First, it will be argued that whilst Turkey’s Alevi population still bears electoral sympathies for the centre-left, this sympathy is due to a lack of any political alternative. Second, the trade unions in Turkey, it will be argued, have very weak links with the centre-left. This is based on fieldwork observation that the unions, who are traditionally considered natural allies of leftist parties, perceive theTurkish centre-left as representing the interests of the state, rather than labour. Finally, an examination of electoral data based on Turkey’s three largest cities (Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir) shows that the centre-left in recent times has failed to gain the support of large urban dwellers, particularly what can be classified as shantytown inhabitants. All three cases help illustrate niches where the centre-left has lost either electoral support, and/or active confidence. The case of the Kurds has been omitted as a separate section here, as it is assumed that the previous chapter has dealt with this issue adequately. Finally this penultimate chapter explores the reasons behind the ideological and structural rigidity. Having analysed the three cases outlined above, the conclusion is reached that the ability of political parties in Turkey to adapt and represent diverse interests has been best achieved by Turkey’s ‘peripheral’ line of parties, challenging the status-quo (parties descended from the DP lineage). This is contrasted directly with the case of west European social democratic parties, who have succeeded in adapting their ideological outlook, to maintain electoral credibility. Turkey’s centre-left, due to its rigid Kemalist heritage and state-building past, has been a poor agent of adaptation.
