ABSTRACT
This chapter is concerned with whether large-scale statebuilding interventions have an impact on democratizing state polities much beyond their metropolitan centers. It reviews the effectiveness of statebuilding in Cambodia vis-à-vis its impact on aspects of the political and social organization of metropolitan elites and rural masses, and finds that, after nearly two decades, political change in both sectors has been superficial and remains operationalized and dominated by informal, socially-ruled systems of patronage and clientelism, rather than determined by impartial, independent and impersonal institutions associated with the democratic prerogative explicit in statebuilding and democratization. The chapter discusses how comprehending political activities is complicated by the appearance of democracy disguising the functioning of political and social institutions. There are, I argue, superficial political institutions in the metropolis of Phnom Penh that are nominally democratic, but which, on closer scrutiny, are political husks. They are less meaningful democratic institutions concerned with the rule of law and the separation of powers, for instance, than they are labeled buildings. Furthermore, rural areas seem even less susceptible to democratization than the metropolis, especially where “new” systems render people temporarily or permanently less secure than the pre-democratic means of social organization. The chapter proposes that statebuilding in Cambodia has been of limited impact in terms of its implicit and explicit democratization agenda. The roots of this “failure to launch” and lack of susceptibility to democratic
conversion are also to be found in many other countries undergoing externally-assisted statebuilding. This suggests that we can make some broad generalizations about likely outcomes of postwar statebuilding and therefore the approaches we might take. The essay concludes by arguing that providing more than the basic pluralization and electoral systems to non-democratic systems would ultimately be ineffective and therefore wasteful. Furthermore, since indigenous polities adapt and reject elements of democracy they find useful or meaningless, hybrid plural-indigenous systems are the most likely, and in some respects the most desirable, outcome. These should be encouraged, I argue, because they allow specific political evolution best suited to local experiences and capacities. This approach would also reduce the risks
and perceptions of “democentricity” and imperious intent. It may also result in statebuilding being conducted more economically and with fewer indigenous and endogenous challenges. The first section of this chapter introduces the subject matter and debate.
The second section discusses the literature on political elitism and common social patronage. The third section describes Cambodia before the recent period of externally-driven statebuilding. The fourth section examines the statebuilding intervention conceptually and practically, focusing on the specific areas of political and social institution building. The fifth section examines Cambodia in the aftermath of the exercise and discusses and explains the lack of democratization in specific areas of elite and social activity. The final section presents some concluding generalizations and recommendations relating to postwar statebuilding interventions.
