ABSTRACT
The book set out to explore why a ‘warm peace’ failed to materialize between Jordan and Israel, ten years into formal peace and despite a treaty – approved by majority vote in each country – laying the foundations for such a peace. An enquiry was launched, rooted in the Jordanian scene, with an eye on identifying structures and agency factors of relevance. The findings showed that the structure of the relationship between Jordan and Israel remained asymmetric. From a Jordanian perspective, it was not equal but still in favour of the Israeli party. That is, the raised expectations on the political and economic fronts did not materialize. Furthermore, the peace process deteriorated between the Palestinians and Israelis with a negative impact on the Jordanian-Israeli track, which revived public fears for the implementation of the alternative homeland project. Earlier chapters illustrated how the relations cooled between top-level leadership in both states, to the extent that certain Jordanian leaders feared that they ‘rushed into’ rapid normalization with Israel. Economically, Israel was able to maintain its monopoly over the Palestinian markets, safeguarding its interests by a number of procedures, which deprived outside competition of a viable edge. Moreover, the Jordanian democratic process set in motion in the late 1980s was constrained in the era of peace mainly so Jordan could maintain its pro-peace foreign policy in the face of the local opposition whose programmes subordinated national interests to extremist or radical ideologies. The majority of those not ideologically opposed to normalization of relations with Israel considered peace with the latter too costly and with no tangible return at the micro-level (especially the quality of life) despite the economic and strategic gains the country secured at the macro level. The power asymmetry combined with unfavourable domestic factors (particularly the strong political culture of anti-normalization enshrined in the professional associations’ laws of boycott and disbarment of members) made it increasingly difficult to push for further normalization at a time when peace itself was becoming hard to keep, let alone promote. Although Jordan completed a full-fledged peace treaty, it remained hampered by domestic exigencies that largely shaped the peace to come. Key among these particularities is the demographic make-up of the society, which presented a formidable structure. This came atop other endemic structural factors like a weak civil society versus overpowering professional associations
with an anti-normalization agenda opposed to all forms of contact with Israel, which precluded the possibility of establishing links with the Israeli civil society in a way that could sensitize each party to the other’s needs.
