ABSTRACT
One of the most appealing elements of Smith’s moral theory, Shaver concedes, is that it seems to constitute an improvement over utilitarianism as a description or explanation of our moral psychology: our moral feelings – approval and disapproval, gratitude and resentment – are generally motivated not by utilitarian calculations but by feelings or sentiments. People typically demand that murderers are punished, for example, because they feel outrage or resentment and not because they calculate that doing so may make society better off in the long run by deterring other potential murderers. Yet, Shaver notes (195-6), Smith also frequently makes normative claims in TMS; in addition to describing the way people do in fact make moral judgments, Smith seems to suggest that people ought to act in such a way that an impartial spectator would approve of them. And Shaver suggests that this is where he runs into trouble.
