ABSTRACT
Rothstein (2000a, 2000b, 2002) and Kumin and Rothstein (2005) discuss social dilemmas, trust and social capital. Rothstein (2000a) identifies an institutional mechanism, which implies that trust can be established ‘from above’ rather than exclusively from below, as argued by Putnam (1993, 1995) and many other scholars of social capital. The trustworthiness of ‘efficient’ institutions creates interpersonal trust, according to Rothstein (2000a), which in turn makes the ‘production’ of social capital in civil society possible. This institutional mechanism ‘from above’ provides the missing link in the theory of social capital and game-theoretical explanations of cooperation. He pursues this line of analysis (2000b, 2002) and argues that differences in general or universal entitlements in universal welfare states promote trust and social capital, while means-tested, or need-tested provision of social services fail to do so. Thus, Kumin and Rothstein (2005) maintain the impact of welfare state institutions can either make or break social capital.
