ABSTRACT
In Chapter 12, I introduced the Hayek-MacIntyre paradox to show the striking similarities between the views of Hayek and MacIntyre on the relation between tradition and reason, especially as it relates to the foundations of morality. The one significant difference between them seems to be merely terminological or semantic, that is Hayek prefers to emphasize traditional values whereas MacIntyre prefers to emphasize traditional virtues. This is the one area in which I would argue that has MacIntyre an advantage. In this chapter we examine a crucial topic where they differ profoundly, that concerning justice. On this topic, I argue that Hayek has a decisive advantage. I suggested in Chapter 12 that MacIntyre’s theory of dialectical justification has strong parallels with Popper’s PRC, with one key difference. This difference is not due to MacIntyre’s use of the term “justification”. It is due rather to his rejection of a basic principle in Popper’s critical philosophy; that arguments are either “deductive or defective” (Chappell 1966: 244). MacIntyre rejects this principle in his discussion of David Hume’s is-ought argument in his Treatise of Human Nature.
