ABSTRACT
Wholly on the basis of his account of human psychology, which is, in turn, based wholly on his metaphysics, Spinoza constructs his moral philosophy. In other words, by examining the metaphysical grounds of our psychology, Spinoza believes he is able to determine what is good for us and what we are morally obligated to do. Further, things in general are to be evaluated simply in terms of what they most fundamentally are, in terms of their natures. Since, as we have seen, our nature and the natures of things in general are shot through with intelligibility, what is good for, and morally required, of each person or thing is a function of that person’s or thing’s intelligibility. This perspective on my nature leads to Spinoza’s view that it is
good and right for me to do whatever is conducive to my happiness, well-being, and power. Thus Spinoza’s rationalist emphasis on intelligibility generates an ethical system that is fundamentally egoistic-centered on the interests and power of the self. But, for Spinoza, ethics is not simply a power grab. As we will see in the second half of this chapter, Spinoza attempts in various ways to smooth out the selfish edge of his egoism by incorporating in this system a genuine concern for others and by articulating methods we can employ to become more powerful and less at the mercy of our passions, and thus to help others as well as ourselves.
