ABSTRACT
Much of Hegel’s originality in conceiving of modern society as mechanistic stems from his complex conceptual grasp of what makes up a mechanism. While many writers before Hegel used the metaphor of a machine or mechanism to understand modern society, the notion of metaphor seems to tilt the scales in favor of nature, as if the concept literally belonged in a certain conception of nature and can only crudely be applied elsewhere. In that Hegel places the figure of mechanism within the development of his Science of Logic, it will be possible to speak of the concept as literally belonging first and foremost in the sphere of metaphysical thought. Departing from its logical status, we can consider the occurrence of mechanistic notions in social philosophy as well as philosophy of nature as an employment of the logical nature of mechanism, which has a more primal, constitutive place in the system. This grasp of mechanism as a logical category will demonstrate that much of what Hegel actually has to say about the mechanism of modern society derives from arguments that are first worked out on the logical level.
