ABSTRACT
The field of agriculturally utilised biodiversity has some particular characteristics, each of which can both help to illustrate the breadth and complexity of the problems involved and bring to light some of the central lines of conflict in a compromised and explicit form. These particular characteristics are manifold. On the one hand, the structure of the problems in the field of agro-biodiversity is characterised by the fact that genetic diversity is the product of human activities over centuries. Therefore, this genetic diversity must be examined from the perspective of the utilisation of nature. Moreover, genetic resources are – apart from their economic importance for capitalist industries – of central relevance for worldwide nutrition and even more for food security in certain regions. On the other hand, the quest for the conservation of Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (PGRFA) is no less pressing due to the dramatic erosion of this genetic diversity. But this search becomes acute under different general conditions and throws up different lines of conflict and actor constellations. The conflicts over the appropriation of genetic resources in this field
already have a much longer history and their principal features can be traced back to the beginning of European expansion and colonialism (Crosby 1972, 1986). However, these conflicts have been given a new momentum by the technological and political shifts in the 1980s. The institutional attempts to deal with these conflicts also go back further and they had already produced important regulating procedures before the CBD. At the same time, the changes which are connected with the coming into force of the CBD, and later with the TRIPS Agreement, are also central for later developments and allow insights into some central dimensions of the problem. Finally, the characteristics of this problem field are reflected in an agreement which has some distinct features compared to the CBD and is characterised above all by an alternative approach to access and benefit-sharing: a Multilateral System for the exchange of genetic resources. At the centre of the following presentation is the genesis and the
enhancements of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGR). This agreement, which is based within the framework of the FAO, was concluded in November 2001 following lengthy
negotiations and thus belongs to the more recent agreements in this field. It regulates international exchange for the subsection of genetic resources which play a particular role for world nutrition. In this part of the PGRFA a multilateral exchange system was developed in the International Treaty, mentioned above, which is intended to take into account the specific characteristics of these resources. The negotiations, however, were extremely difficult and were repeatedly threatened with failure. Even after their conclusion in 2001, some important issues had not been appropriately resolved and it took another five years until the specific regulations concerning the multilateral system of exchange could be finished – and their actual effectiveness is still difficult to judge. Thus, in these negotiations, the question of the relationships of the different international agreements to one another as well as that of their relationship to the sovereignty of nation-states became highly divisive. The options of regulating the use of genetic technology remained controversial, as did the applicability of intellectual property rights and patents and the chances local actors and farming communities had of having their interests in these international agreements adequately considered (here, primarily in reference to the embodiment of the principle of Farmers’ Rights, see below). These controversial issues, however, are not expressions of the contra-
dictions between ecology and economy or between conservation and utilisation. Rather, they represent a conflict between different forms of human utilisation of nature. These conflicts can be described as conflicts between traditional and industrial forms of agriculture (whereby the traditional forms can vary quite considerably). At first glance, this produces a NorthSouth conflict. But this line is shaped in various ways, since in Southern countries the conflicts of interest reproduce themselves internally in face of a variety of agricultural production systems. In the field of PGRFA in general, it is particularly difficult for nation-states both in the South and in the North to formulate a policy which is consistent within itself. At the level of nation-states a whole number of different ministries and authorities are involved (from the usually responsible agricultural ministries through environmental, trade and justice ministries to the foreign ministry) and the complexity of the problems requires particular expert knowledge (Petit et al. 2000). Even the interests of the most important actors, that is the governments of the nation-states, can be internally clarified and harmonised only with difficulty and in lengthy negotiations as part of a state project. In addition, the interests of the biotechnology industry and those of traditional, non-capitalist forms of agriculture conflict with each other here, although usually not by way of direct confrontation between the actors but rather in the form of different interpretations of the problem and the corresponding strategies. Representatives of indigenous or rural groups are personally present at the negotiations only in exceptional cases, for example at the conference ‘‘In Safe Hands’’ on the occasion of the FAO Conference in June 1996 in Leipzig. In the course of the negotiations, their interests were
often represented by certain NGOs (primarily seeds NGOs; see Brand 2000: 209ff.). The NGOs in this sector usually proceed from a decidedly political standpoint and understand themselves explicitly as the representatives of these interests. They are concerned above all with the respect of particular characteristics of agriculturally utilised biodiversity and, related to that, with the propagation of Farmers’ Rights and the limiting and prevention of intellectual property rights. The conflict is also partly interpreted as one between the private and the public spheres, between genetic resources as private property or as a public or common good (e.g. Petit et al. 2000). It remains quite unclear here what exactly is meant by a public good and in what relationship it stands both to private property and to Farmers’ Rights. In any case, the strategy of capitalist valorisation, including its ecological effects, is at the centre of the conflict. On closer examination, however, this strategy is supported by a broad spectrum of actors with quite varying interests: from middle-class seed growers to biotechnological TNCs. Since in this area a considerable process of concentration and displacement is taking place, an identity of capital interests cannot be assumed, particularly between small, specialised firms and the large monopolies. Nevertheless, they ultimately work together in the privatisation of genetic resources. The industry is permanently represented at international negotiations by relatively powerful associations – such as, for example, the lobby association Bio or the international association of plant producers, ASSINEL. However, it is not clear whether they in fact have an interest in obtaining access to genetic resources in the Southern countries or whether the material which already exists in the ex situ collections or in the large gene data bases in the North is sufficient for them (RAFI 2001a; see Le Buanec 2005). The cooperation of the actors and their interests in this field is therefore
complex. In the following section we shall elaborate on how a valorisation paradigm was established in this area even though it met with considerable opposition from a number of actors, much of which stemmed from the highly explosive conflict over the exclusion of the patentability of PGRFA. The different interpretations of the problem and their interplay in the genesis of the ITPGR play a decisive role here. We shall deal in particular with the important function of experts and the constitution of a dominant interpretation of the problem and the options relating to its resolution. In addition, we shall examine the fundamental question of the coherence of state and inter-state politics. Are the tensions and contradictions between different fields of politics (agriculture, environment, trade, property rights, to name only the most important) decisive for the fact that ‘‘governments can’t make a policy’’ (Petit et al. 2000)? Or are these contradictions between different parts of the state apparatus (and the connected international state apparatuses) the expression of antagonistic social relationships at the national and international level – and is the search for coherence in fact an attempt to establish a power-shaped stabilisation of these relationships? What does the search for a coherent policy in this area actually mean? To
what extent can suitable answers to the problem structure in fact be formulated? And how do national and international lines of conflict overlap here? We shall have to deal here above all with the questions of whether and to what extent the ‘‘multilateral system of exchange’’ with regard to the regulation of access and benefit-sharing and compared to the CBD is in fact as differently designed and constituted as sometimes claimed. What is the function of the ITPGR and the Multilateral System with regard to the problem and to the interests of locally situated actors? Can it in fact consolidate their interests and does it increase their chances of gaining influence? In order to be able to answer these questions it is first necessary to take a closer look at the complex problem, the history of this conflict and the genesis of the ITPGR before the agreement itself can be examined in more detail.
